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Chapter I .
An

Introduction to Urbanization in Latin America
Introduction

The study of urbanization, or more specifically the rural-urban
migration proces s , has taken many forms .

Analyses of Latin American

urbanization have ranged from tightly designed empirical work, most
of which has appeared in the last ten year s , to theorizing on the nature
of man in urban society, with more or less loosely organized secondary
source investigations filling the continuum between these two extremes .
Unfortunately political scientists were probably the last to join the
other social scientists in the study of urbanization.

However, now

that the political perspective is beginning to receive more attention,
the empirical base of urbanization studies has been expanded, primarily at the earlier theorists' expense .

That is , a few of today ' s

new crop of political scientists are collecting data and producing
evidence which is already making a shambles of "urban-instability"
theories that grew out of the work of Robert E . Park, Louis Wirth,
and others from the early "Chicago School" of urban sociology .

1

This paper will center on one aspect of the debate concerning
the roots of urban instability with the somewhat lofty aim of clarifying and consequently analyzing the polarized views which have arisen.
1

See R. E . Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man, " American
Journal of Sociology , 3 (May, 1928) , 881-893; and L . Wirth, "Urbanism
as a Way of Life" in A. J . Reiss (ed . ) , Louis Wirth on Cities and Social
Life (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1964).
1

2
The primary concern of this writer will be to focus on the political
attitudes and behavior of rural migrants once they reach the city.

To

put it very simply, this writer wants to know if the migrants become
politically radicalized.
Generally the time span of this paper will include the period
from 1930 to present; however , primary emphasis (particularly in the
case studies of Mexico, Venezuela , and Chile) will be placed in the
period during the 19SO ' s and 1960 ' s .
Before proceeding further , it might be best to clarify the meaning
of some of the more important terms which will continually reappear
throughout the following discussion.

For this writer ' s purposes the

term political radicalization will assume a rather broad meaning in
that it will imply migrant attitu4es and , more importantly, behavior
committed to maj or alterations of the existing political structure .
Obviously then, this definition includes support of extreme reactionary
movements , such as Peronism in Argentina, as well as the more classic
radicalism indicated by support of Communist and other extreme left
wing movements.

Determinants of political radicalism will be the extent

to which nonsupportive attitudes are distributed through the populace
and the extent to which such feelings are actually translated into be
havior contributing to conditions of political instability.
The primary ind:Sx· for political radicalism will be preference
and support for radical political parties on the basis of ideology•
Table 1 . indicates what parties this writer will type as radical within
the Latin American context .

Because of the constantly changing nature

of the Latin American political party system, this table should not be

3
strictly adhered to· .

For example, as in the case of Mexico's one-

party dominated system, when a party generally typed as non-radical,
Table 1

2

Latin American Party Types I By Ideology

Ideology

Example

Type

NonRadical

Conservative

Radical

Socialist
Communist
Populist
Personalist

Chilean
Party
Liberal
Radical
Chilean
Party

Liberal
Radical
Christian Democrat or Christian
Socialist

United Conservative
(PCU)
Party of Chile (PL)
Party of Chile (PR)
Christian Democratic
(PDC)

Socialist Party of Chile (PS)
Chilean Communist Party (PCCH)
Brazilian Labor Party (PTB)
Peron ' s party in Argentina
(Partido Peronista)

becomes a relevant opposition force to the existing system it should ,
in that case, be classified as radical .

Also there are parties which

have not been historically consistently radical or non-radical.
/

An ex-

/

ample is the Aprista party Accion Democratica in Venezuela which served
as a radical political force from 1948 to 1957, but today represents
the elected government .

However, this table will generally serve as an

acceptable guideline for measuring political radicalism by party identif ication .
2
see Martin Needler , Latin American Politics in Perspective ,
(Princeton, N . J . : Van Nostrand , 1963) , 88-111.

4
Continuing with the clarification of terms, political instability is
defined as a state of conflict between governments and (compet ing)
power groups which is characterized by overt acts of violence, by support
for extreme political radicalism, or by apathy in the face of movements
Table 2 3
Criteria for and Manifestations of System
Stability/Instability
Stable
Criteria
High rate of economic growth
Equal income distribution
High political capability
Broad-based institutionalized
political parties

Manifestations
Dictatorship

Democracy
Continue as
democracy

No increase in coercion
with option available
for evaluation to democratic system

Unstable
Criteria
Low rate of economic growth
Unequal income distribution
Low political capability
Narrow personalistic
political parties

3

Manifestations
Democracy

Dictatorship

Inflation decentralized violence, military intervention,
social revolution

Inflation, increase
in level of coercion, decentralized
violence, social
revolution

Ernest A . Duff and John F . Mccamant, "Measuring Social and Political
Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," The American Political
Science Review, (December 1968) , 1126.

5
which are committed to extreme dislocations of the established power
structure.

Generally political instability is more likely to occur when

the governing institutions of organized society are relatively inef fective in gratifying popular wants and expectations . _ Obviously this
definition is so broad that it may be said that no country in Latin
America is completely free from political instability.
In this sense, probably the best that can be done is to rank on a
comparative basis those countries which will be dealt with most frequently.

Table 2 summarizes the criteria for stability ranking.

On

this basis Table 3 lists the relative scores of those countries most
4
Table 3
System Stability Scores

Country
High
Stability

Chile
Brazil
Peru
Venezuela
Argentina
Mexico
Colombia

System Stability

+ .75
+ .18
+ .04
.03
- .04
.36
- .36

important to our discussion.
Political alienation is closely related to political instability
in that a failure of governments to gratify popular wants leads to
4
Ernest A . Duff and John F . Mccaman t , "Measuring Social and Poli
tical Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," The American
Political Science Review , (December 1968) , 1138.

6
political alienation in varying degrees of intensity.

A deeply felt

resentment toward social and governing institutions is usually characteristic of this kind of alienation; and , at times , these feelings may
be so intense as to be manifested in happenings which contribute to
political instability.

In this sense it may be said that political

alienation is a necessary condition for political instability, but not
necessarily vice-versa .
Another term closely linked to political instability is relative
deprivation, which one writer says is a necessary precondition for civil
strife of any kind. 5

Relative deprivation is not whatever the outside

observer thinks people ought to be dissatisfied with.

It is a state of

mind that can be defined as a discrepancy between people's expectations
about the goods and conditions of life to which they are justifiably
entitled , on the one hand and on the other their value capabilities,
that is what they perceive to be their chances for getting and keeping
those goods and conditions.
Finally , anomie is another term which has begun to appear quite
frequently in discussions concerning political instability.

Anomie is

defined as the lack of stable cognitive orientations to a changed situation, and may take the form of a significant decline in religious
participation, a high divorce rate, a loss of both trust and a sense of
cohesion in interpersonal relations .

Generally an anomic response to

urban life is indicative of a breakdown of traditional norms , value
systems , and social controls which may in turn lead to an increased
5
Ted Gurr , "Urban Disorder : .Perspectives from the Comparative
Study of Civil Strif e , " American Behavioral Scientist, 11 (March
April, 1968), 5 0 .

7
potential for supporting extremist movements.
J . Clyde Mitchell refers to urbanization as the process of becoming
urban , moving to cities, changing from agriculture· to other pursuits
common to cities, and correspondant change of behavior patterns .

6

Along

the same lines, it appears that the customary characterization of rural
urban migration involves a farm resident moving to the city.

7

However ,

in the Latin American context this definition must be refined to indicate that this movement is rarely direct.

Generally , this movement

occurs in stages where the migrant goes first from the farm to a small
town, and then to a larger town, and ultimately to the city.

8

In any

case, it is clear that rural-urban migration is an integral part of the
urbanization process.
Certainly little time need be spent in j ustifying the study of
Latin American urbanization.

In almost all of the countries of this

area, urbanization has been one of the maj or social phenomena of the
late nineteenth and the twentieth century .

It has been pointed out that :

There is no Latin American country in which there has
been a trend away from urbanization ; everywhere the impres
sive fact has been the movement toward the city, the
swelling of urban populations. This trend has given rise
to what is sometimes referred to as the problem of ' la
cabeza de Goliat ' (Goliath ' s head) , characterizing a
country in which a giant urban head rests upon a dwarf
like rural body . This situation is most acute in Cuba and
Uruguay , where more than half the national populations live
in the metropolitan areas of Havana and Montevideo; Argentina,
6

wilbert E . Moore and Neil J . Smelser (eds . ) , Urbanization in Newly
Developing Countries (Englewood Cliffs , N .J . : Prentice-Hall, Inc . , 1966) ,
5.
7Bruce H . Herrick, Urban Migration and Economic Development in Chile
(Cambridge, Mass . : The M. I . T . Press, 1965) , 10.
8

Evidence supporting this statement will be presented in chapter III.

8
where a little more than one-fourth of the people are
located in Greater Buenos Aires ; and Venezuela , where
approximately 20 percent of the population lives in
Caracas . • • • 9
One writer states that the rate of urbanization in Latin America
is higher than that of any other underdeveloped region in the world .
He observes that while the projected figures for the Latin American
countries as a whole indicate an annual increase in population of from
2 . 5 to 2 . 8 percent for the next fifteen years , it is estimated that
during the same period Latin American cities will add some 4 . 2 to 5
percent to their population each year . 10

The following data (See

Table 4) give some idea of the contribution migration is making to
Table 4

11

Percentage of the total urban population growth due to natural
increase and to migration during the last intercensal
periods for selected countries
Country

Venezuela
Colombia
Dominican
Republic
El Salvador
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
Cuba

Intercensal
period

Approximate percentage of the urban
growth due to
Migration
Natural increase

1941-50
1938-51

29
32

71
68

1935-51
1930-50
1940-50
1940-52
1940-50
1931-43

35
46
51
53
58
74

65
54
49
47
42
26

'
9
George I . Blanksten, "The Politics of Latin America" in Gabriel
A . Almond and James S . Coleman (eds . ) , The Politics of the Developing
Areas (Princeton , J .J . : Princeton University Press , 1960) , 470 .
10
c .M. Harr, "Latin America ' s Troubled Cities," Foreign Affairs, 41
(3) (April 1963) , 540.
llPhilip M. Hauser, Urbanization in Latin America, (New York:
International Documents Service, 1961) , 110.

9
urban growth in selected Latin American countries.

The facts speak

for themselves that the study of urbanization and its attendent problems is crucial to an understanding of Latin American political
instability .
In order to arrive at a better understanding of the central
problem this writer proposes to deal with, it might first be helpful
to present some general historical and theoretical information concerning the urbanization process in Latin America.
General History and Theory of
Latin American Urbanization
The earliest cities in Latin America grew out of the urban
colonization of western South America during the sixteenth century .
Systematic exploration, colonization, and urbanization began with the
arrival of Francisco Pizarro ' s expedition on the northern coast of
Peru in 1532.

The following half-century was the formative period

of urban ecology of the region.

By 1582 a pattern of cities covered

the arable and otherwise useful areas of Peru, Ecuador , and Bolivia ,
with parts of Chile, Argentina , and Colombia.
There are several reasons for the creation of these new citie s .
Charles V and Philip I I , who ruled Spain during the sixteenth-century
colonization of Peru, showed constant interest in the founding of
towns , and it is suggested that their special favor was to be conferred on those who were successful at this aspect of the enterprise.
12

Ralph A . Gakenheimer , "The Peruvian City of the Sixteenth
Century , " in Glenn H . Beyer (ed . ) , The Urban Explosion in Latin
America (Ithaca , N .Y . : Cornell University Press, 1967), 37 .

12

10
The purpose of collective worship has been a cause for the gathering
of people in various periods of history, and religious leaders have
at times encouraged urbanism as a means of keeping people within
the reach of doctrine and discipline .

In addition towns were often

founded as an obvious and necessary establishment for defense of the
settlers .

Finally the city offered hope of a means of income to

those without livelihood.

With immigrants arriving in large numbers,

many destitute but convinced that the colonies offered great oppor
tunity , there were large numbers of vagrants in the cities who con
stituted a drain on the economy and a potentially dangerous group
in search of military and political involvement .

The creation of

new towns to entice these people from the existing ones and cause
them to be profitably engaged was an obvious remedy to the situation .
Of course , the list goes on and on, but the preceding renders some
insight into the reasons for city growth in Latin America.
There appear to have been three main stages of urbanization in
Latin America following the initial period of Spanish and Portuguese
colonization.

The first of these stages was a time of consolidating

colonial institutions and establishing the structure of colonial
society.

This stage, which roughly covers the period from the early

1600 ' s to the early 1800 ' s , saw no deep changes disturbing the general
pattern.

The principal centers from which the colonies were adminis

tered were consolidated .

Only a few centers acquired importance and

presented some urban aspect , chiefly those in which commercial activi
ties and religious, administrative, military , and cultural institutions

11
were concentrated.

Thus the continental importance o� Lima , Mexico

City, and Bahia, and the regional importance of Havana , Rio de Janeiro,
Buenos Aires, Caracas , Santiago , Bogota , and other center s , were defined.
During the second stage, covering the last half of the nineteenth
century and the early years of the twentieth century , immigration from
Europe was the chief factor of change.

Latin American cities that grew

during this period , according to one v�ewpoint, were those in a posi
tion to profit from the prevailing economic advantages.

Buenos Aires,

for example, grew because it was outward-looking, European, dynamic,
and economically active.
During the last stage, the one we are now living in , the long
delayed incorporation of rural groups has sent these groups to the
cities.

This·period has seen the growth, faster than before, of the

few industrial centers of each country; at the same time, the popula
tion of the rural towns and areas has decreased .

Furthermore,· this

process has been greatly accelerated in the past ten to twenty years
as the deteriorating . rural sector has become a most significant cause
for movement to urban centers.
This mass movement to the city has had enormous social , economic ,
and political implications .

From the standpoint of poli�ical implica

tions these large masses, transplanted in short order to the cities,
transformed suddenly from rural peon s , artisans , or persons with hard
ships into industrial workers, acquired political significance without
at the s �me time finding the institutional channels necessary for inte
grating themselves into the normal functioning of the political

12
system.

13

Some analysts have argued that the situation described in the
preceding paragraph has been quite important in creating social unrest
which in turn produces system instability in Latin America.

14

On the

other hand , there has also been strong evidence provided that this
combination of working class mobilization without any corresponding
class integration, far from adding to social unres t , gave great support
to the middle classes .

15

One of the primary purposes of this paper is

to analyze both of these arguments in order to gain some insight into
the political process in Latin America .

First , however, it should be

beneficial to briefly look at the
recent historical role that migrants
J
have played in the urban political process.
The masses of the urban poor have always participated to some
extent in the political life of the cities and republics.

Politicians

sought their support, particularly where their support was channeled
through a labor movement.

However, it appears tha t , in most cases ,

new urban poor have had the effect of bursting the bounds of any already
existing labor movements and similarly destroying much of the unity of
style of the smaller and older proletariat.

16

Thus it could be con-

13

For a broad presentation of this theory see William Kornhauser, The
Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill . : The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959) .
14 For example see Kenneth F . Johnson , "Causal Factors in Latin
American Political Instability , " Western Political Quarterly, 3 (Sept . ,
1964) , 432-446 .
15
John J . Johnson, Political Change in Latin America : The Emergence
of the Middle Sectors (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1958) , 41-42.
l6E . J . Hobsbawn , "Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics" in
Claudia Veliz (ed . ) � The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (London:
Oxford University Press, 1967) , 5 9 .

13
eluded that the new urban poor have actually aided the process of
depolitization in Latin America.

Furthermore, it may well be that

the unorganized activities of the laboring poor, such as riots, have
had a similar effect .

Hobsbawn points out that it is remarkable how

few riots - even food riots - there have been in the great Latin
American cities during periods when the mass of �heir impoverished
and economically deprived inhabitants multiplied .

17

"

the last

great riot of the unaided poor in Bogota (student-initiated riots are
another matter) occurred in 1948, since then the population of the
city - and it is fair to say the body of misery it contains - has
18
risen from less than 650 , 000 (1951) to over a million (1964) . 1 1
Of course the rural influx also affects the pattern of political
parties and votes .

It could easily be argued that the characteristic

populist leaders and parties of the 1940 ' s and 1950's, whatever their
claim to national and rural interest, represented primarily movements
based on the urban poor, and hence, increasingly, new internal migrants.
Certainly this is clearly the case of Argentina, where Per�n deliberately made himself the spokesman of the creole up-country migrants
against the European and cit�fied natives of Buenos Aires .

The poli-

ticians who have succeeded in gaining the support of the urban masses
vary widely in their personalities or political attitudes.

They might

17E . J . Hobsbawn, "Peasants and Rural Migrants in Politics"
in Claudia Veliz (ed . ) , The Politics of Conformity in Latin America
(London : Oxford University Press, 1967) , 6 0 .
18

Ibid.

14
be old-fashioned oligarchs or generals who gained a reputation for
helping the people by lavish patronage, or the provision of work,
or the right kind of building, or who were merely lucky enough to
coincide with a period of exceptional prosperity.
Perhaps what the preceding points out most clearly is that the
new urban masses are rarely the political organizers , but instead
generally those who are organized and manipulated .

19

The only clear

,
case to the contrary is that of Colombia, where Gaitan's assassination
was followed by a formidable and entirely spontaneous rising of the
Bogota poor .

But the situation which developed in Colombia between

1934 and 1948 was so clearly one of potential - and not merely urban social revolution from below that normal criteria hardly apply to i t .
Nonetheless , it should not b e concluded that because of the
apparent lack of initiative of the new urban masses that they might
not still provide an important potential source for political radicalism in Latin America.

Indeed the fact that these urban masses are

apparently so easily manipulated by oligarchs and generals , who know
.
how to transform their potential into effective action, may render
them all the more of an explosive destabilizing forc e .

This being the

case, it appears more information is needed before any conclusions
may be reached .

In this respect, it may aid the reader to have a more

general knowledge of the rural-urban migration process.

Primarily,

the focus will be on causes for the migration phenomenon in order. to
l9 see Jacques Lambert, Latin America: Social Structures and
Political Institutions (Berkeley : University of California Press,
1967 ) , 191; and Hobsbawn in Veliz , op . cit . , 6 3 .

15
hopefully shed light on its effects.
Two sorts of pressures have been hypothesized which could lead
to migration from a rural setting to an urban one" . 20
usually been called the "push. "

The first has

The pressure of rural poverty, under

this hypothesis, pushes the farmer off the land .

It seems that the

tendency in Latin American studies is to emphasize the push factors :

21

the lack of opportunity for change in status ; t�e displacement of
functions by rapid farm mechanization; the high degree of soil exhaustion in many areas; the ineffective administration, marketing , and
servicing facilities in rural areas.

22

Explanations for rural poverty

generally focus on low agricultural productivity, which in turn is
blamed on lack of education and energy of the cultivators, or on land
tenure arrangements that fail to provide incentives for capital improvements, or on government price policies that discourage investment in
agriculture .

Whatever the correct cause, or combination of causes, for

low agricultural productivity, the result is still the same .

Low

incomes in agriculture push farmers out of their rural pursuits and
into the only alternatives that exist for them : the town and the city.
The second type of pressure on would-be migrants is the "pull"
of more attractive urban opportunities.

Generally these opportunities

are defined as job opportunities or chances for increased pay.

How-

ever , it has been pointed out that the flow to cities is a good deal
2°
For a general discussion of this point see Herrick, op. c i t . , 13-15.
21

Irving Louis Horowitz , "Electoral Politics , Urbanization, and
Social Development in Latin America," in Beyer , op. cit . , 224.
22

see, for example, Andrew G. Frank, "Urban Poverty in Latin
Americ a , " Studies in Comparative International Development , Vol. II ,
1966 , 7 6 .

16
greater than real opportunities for sta�le employment or adequate
housing. 23

Thus the attraction to the city cannot be attributed to

industrial growth alone.

This "lure" is undoubtedly linked to such

things as the desire to give children the advantages of education,
health and welfare, general culture , etc.

In addition such factors

as opportunities for entertainment, marriage, or even crime have been
considered by some theorists.

24

To sum up, it seems clear that the

causes for rural-urban migration may be explained through some combination of the "push" and "pull" hypotheses.
purposes of this paper may be stated .

At this point the main

In addition the hypotheses and

method of approach will also be presented.
Statement of Purpose
This paper has several purposes which are:

(1) to present the

theories and evidence which point to the rural-urban migrants as an
important source of political radicalism in Latin America;

(2) to

present the evidence of those who argue that the preceding theories
are based on unconfirmed generalizations and are in fact inadequate
as explanatory devices;

(3) to broaden the horizons of this kind of

study by analyzing the Latin American rural-urban migration process
in selected country studies (specifically this will focus on the
migrant ' s relation to the electoral process in these countries and
23

Horowitz in Beyer , op. cit . , 224 .

24

samuel A . Stouffer , "Intervening Opportunities : A Theory
Relating Mobility and Distance , " American Sociological Review, Vol. 5 ,
No. 6 (Dec . , 1940), 845-867.

17
his propensity to engage in radical political activity through this
process) ; and finally (4) to propose a more constructive theory to
explain the migrant ' s propensity for radical activity.
In a more general context it is hoped that this paper will pro
vide some organization and continuity to a previously widely scattered
body of knowledge which renders itself useful to'the study of political
instability in Latin America.
Statement of Hypotheses
1.

Rural-urban migration does breed a certain amount of economic

frustration and will continue to breed even more frustration in the
future.

However, at present the amount of economic frustration as a

result of this process is much less than some "urban-instability
theorists" would have us believe.
The main problem with the "economic frustration" thesis is that
it apparently does not account for the fact t�at although economically
the.migrant may still have problems in his new urban environment, they
are generally not as severe as those he had before he moved.
It may be true that the economic frustration that does result is
generally a product of a situation where urbanization is proceeding at
a faster rate than industrialization ; however , there doesn ' t appear to
be any way of testing this.
2.

Rural-urban migrants generally have few problems with socio

psychological adjustment.
There is virtually no evidence that supports the proposition that
migrants encounter difficulties in making a successful mental adjustment

18
to the urban setting .
3.

Because there is not really a great amount of economic frustration

among rural-urban migrants and because they have few socio-psychological
adjustment problems, alienation from the political system is not
generally characteristic of this group.
Most of the problems the migrant is faced with are quite indivi
dual , and thus rarely does he relate his needs to the system as a whole.
However , this situation is not likely to remain static in the future .
As urban educational opportunities continue to increase , so too will
the number of politically aware migrant s .

This increased political

awareness cannot help but lead to greater system awareness.
4.

A study of migrant voting behavior reveals that recent migrants ,

in this respect, tend to be no more politically radical than the re
maining rural residents in the areas migrated from.
In a historical sense the preceding statement may also be true
for the period roughly from 1930 to 1950.

However what is significant

for this period is that both the rural and ex-rural masses played a re
latively important role in the radicalization of Latin .American poli
tics, reflected in various successful and abortive revolutions and
changes of regimes.

Presently neither group appears to be displaying

much of the potential radicalizing effect they still possess .

This

suggests a theory based on stages , and will be pursued further in the
preceding chapters.
5.

On the basis of the preceding hypotheses, it does not appear that ,

at present, recent rural-urban migrants are likely to engage ·in radical
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political activity.

(This situation, however, will probably change

in the not too distant future . )
Method of Approach
Two basic methods will be used for this paper .

The first will

consist of gathering and organizing available mat�rial in periodical
articles , papers, and books in such a form to proy ide evidence to
test my hypotheses.

In addition, in the chapter whic� deals with

migrant voting patterns there will be an attempt to interpret "raw"
election data in order to better ascertain the political behavior of
the new urban masses.

Unquestionably the greatest limitation of this

study is the fact that it will not be possible to conduct new surveys ,
and thus there will be almost total dependence on data gathered and ,
in most cases , interpreted by other writer s .

I n this regard it should

be pointed out that only recently have there begun to appear solid
empirical studies dealing with or related to this topic.

Obviously,

this too is a limiting factor.
In the next chapter the "radical migrant" theories and evidence
relating to them will be presented.

Chapter II
Theories and Evidence Concerning the Radical
Migrants and Marginals
Theories proposing the political radicalization of new urban
residents have been with us a long time .

Plutarch and Livy, writing

of the mob violence and riots in Rome during the close of the Republic, noted that the source of trouble rested with the recent
migrants - the rural population that was leaving the land and flock
ing to the city.

25

Recently the list of articles asserting this

general proposition has grown considerably longer and the prophecies
of some have taken on more ominous dimensions .

One writer presents

the case particularly forcefully saying that:
"All over the world , often long in advance of effec
tive industrialization, the unskilled poor are streaming
away from subsistence agriculture to exchange the squalor
of rural poverty for the even deeper miseries of the
shanty-towns , "favellas" , and 'bidonvilles' that , year
after year, grow inexorably on the fringes of ·developing
c ities •
• • • • Unchecked , disregarded ,
left to grow and
fester, there is here enough explosive material to pro
duce in the world at large the pattern of a bitter class
conflict finding to an increasing degree a racial basis ,
erupting in guerilla warfare , and threatenin g , ultimately
°
the security even of the comfortable West . 11 2
It is interesting that the approach taken in developing the
"radical migrant" theory is rarely the same .

Some, operating within

25Peter Lupsha , "On Theories of Urban Violence , " presented at the
American Political Science Association meetings in 1968, 6 .
26

Barbara Ward , "The Uses of Prosperity , " Saturday Review, August
29 , 1964 , 191.
20
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a Marxist framework, see the new urban masses a s the core o f the
proletariat movement in the revolution to free colonized people s . 27
Others focus on the political system and the increasing burdens put
upon it by the process of social mobilization of the migrant s. 28

But

no matter what the approach , the general conclusion is the same - the
frustrated and disoriented migrants are a sure source of political
radicalism and therefore likely to produce system instability.
From the various approaches there have resulted two basic "radical
migrant" theories .

The first focuses on the new migrants as the radical

source while the other proposes that the threat to political stability
lies not with newcomers , but with those frustrated slum dwellers who are
long-term urban residents , or even with the second generation .

In order

to simplify our terminology , we will hereafter refer to the new migrant s
(those with ten or less years of urban residence) as the migrant s .

The

longer-term urban residents (those with ten to twenty years of urban
residence) will be referred to as the marginals .

In the following pages

these two theories will be treated in turn.
The Migrant Radical:

Theories

For the purposes of this paper theories concerning the migrants
may be reduced to three general themes.
1.

The economic frustration theory proposes that migrants have

27 For example , see Franz Fannon, The Wretched of the Earth , (New
York: Grove Press, Inc . , 1963) , 103 .
28
see Rarl W . Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Develop
ment ," The American Political Science Review, LV, N o .,.3 (Sept . , 1961) , 497 .
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high economic aspirations when they arrive, but generally fail to
participate in the material rewards of urban society.

This, it is

argued , produces a "frustration gap" between high expectations and
the ability to fulfill them which results both from the inadequate
premigration preparation of the migrants and the inab ility of urban
government and private enterprise to accommodate them. 29

Migrants

are deficient in both the skills to earn a living in their new
environment and the education needed to learn these skills;30 as a
result upward mobility becomes myth to them.

Moreove r , the number

of persons crowding into urban areas has exceeded the needs of industry, commerce, and the service trades.

As a result government

is faced with unprecedented demands , far from being met, for more
services of all types .

Thus for the majority of migrants , th e city

brings objective living conditions often worse than those endured
in the countryside.

Frustrated and disillusioned , the migrants are

· readily persuaded to political violence or extremism. 31
2.

Migrants experience major social and psychological problems

in adjusting to the urban environment .

Most of the newcomers have

been torn from tightly structured rural society and plunged into a
29Paul Keoso , "A Developing Democracy ," in Russel C. Ewing ( ed . ) ,
Six Faces of Mexico (Tucson, Ariz . : University of Arizona Press, 1966) ,
p . 164 .
3°
For example , see Gino Germani , "Inquiry into the Social Effects
of Urbanization in a Working-class Sector of Greater Buenos Aires," in
Philip M . Hauser (ed . ) , Urbanization in Latin America, (New York:
Colombia University Press , 1961) , 223-224 .
31

K . F . Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political
Instability , " op. cit . , 4 3 9 .
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bewildering , impersonal , and harsh environment with few or no
sources of support and guidance.
organization
anomie.

32

Shock and general social dis-

produce personal disorientation and political

This in turn often leads to an undermini�g of orthodox

religious values and the final result is an "anomic gap" , a time
lag between the loss of the traditional value system and the
acceptance of a replacement system.

33

During this period the

migrant is particularly vulnerable to recruitment into extremist
political movements which seek to satisfy his psychological need
for reintegration.
3.

Urbanization creates increased awareness of government and

politics which in turn leads to mobilization of radical opposition
force.

Proponents of this theory say that exposure to the urban en-

vironment with its higher level of social communication and salience
of organized political activity accelerates the politicization of
migrants and creates conditions for mass involvement in direct politi
cal action.

34

Migrant frustrations and anxieties , outlined abov e ,

stemming from problems of assimilation into the urban environment are
translated into support for and recruitment into extremist groups seek-

32Martin C . Needler , Latin American Politics in Perspective
(Princeton, N .J . : Van Nostrand , 1963 ) , 63-64 .
33
G . Soares and R . L . Hamblin, "Socio-economic Variables and
Voting for the Radical Lef t : Chile, 1952," The American Political
Science Review , 61 (December , 1967 ) , 1054 .
34

K . F . Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political
Instability , " op. cit . , 441.
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ing participants for a riot.

35

Thus it may be expected that the anti-

system, protest vote in a given region will increase in response to
high urbanization rate s .

36

The increasingly politicized urban masses,

with a high potential for radical agitation, pose a real threat to
orderly development within the Latin American political system.
The Migrant Radical :

37

Evidence

There does not appear to be a great deal of evidence to substantiate these interrelated migrant theories; however , a few analysts
have collected data which merit consideration.

Bryan Roberts, while

conducting a study in a poor neighborhood in Guatemala City found that
public political activists (that is those who participate in demonstrations , etc . ) appear to include a higher percentage of migrants .
That i s , 72 percent of the family heads in the neighborhood studied
are migrants while 90 percent of the activists are migrants .

In

addition he found that among the migrants in the neighborhood, the
group that is most active in public political behavior is the residents
35

Kenneth F . Johnson, Urbanization and Political Change in Latin
America (Ph . D . dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles,
1963; Ann Arbor, Mich . : University Microfilms , 1964, No. 64-2244 ) ,
pp . 137-138; and Dankwart A . Rustow, A World of Nations : Problems of
Political Modernization (Washington D .C . : The Brookings Institution,
1967), 245 .
36soares and Hamblin, o p . cit . , 1062.
37 Rex D. Hopper, "Research on Latin American Sociology , " in
Charles Wagley (ed . ) , Social Science Research on Latin America, (New
York: Columbia University Press , 1964 ) , 264; also see Samuel P .
Hunting ton, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale
University Press , 1968) , 281-283 ; and John W. Dyckman, "Some Condi
tions of Civic Order in an Urbanized World", Daedalus, (Summer, 1966),
798-799.
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.
who have been in the city less than ten year s .

However, Roberts

also points out that this same group is least politically active
privately (His selected index of private political behavior is.
voting . ) .
Table 5

39

Voting and Migrant Status of Husbands and Wives
in Two Guatemala City Neighborhoods
(Percentages)

.

Years of Residence in Guatemala City
One or both
since birth

Both 20
or more

Both at
least 10-20

One or Both
less than 10

Vote

42

42

40

26

Do
Not
Vote

58

58

60

74

At best Roberts' evidence is inconclusiv e .

The migrants appear

to be politically active publicly, but not privately .

Also the in-

dices he has selected are directed at determining general political
behavior patterns and thus yield little information concerning the
migrants propensity for political radicalism.

Indices for public

38Bryan Robert s , "Urban Poverty and Political Behavior in
Guatemala , " Human Organization (Spring , 1970) , 25.
39

Ibid. , 2 4 .
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political behav ior include participation in local betterment committees (hardly an indicator of radical political behavior) as well as
participation in demonstrations .

On

the other hand, the fact that

74 percent of the new migrants do not vote at all might lead one to
conclude that this group is not likely to engage in private radical
political action or any other kind of private political action for
that matter.

Clearly if Roberts' evidence is the best.available,

then it may be concluded that the migrant theories are not well substantiated .
Problems With the Migrant Radicalization Theories
Data which can explain where the migrant theory goes wrong are
more plentiful than ev�dence on the migrant behavior itself .

40

The

assumption that migrants tend to be politically disruptive rests on
the image of such migrants as uprooted , isolated , and deprived , hence
anomic, frustrated, and prone to express frustration through political channels.

Each aspect of this image may be separately examined.

First although migrants are by definition uprooted, they are
usually better prepared for city life than is commonly assumed.

Al-

though the proportions vary greatly from country to country and among
maj or cities within each country, it may still be generally said that
much migration into the great urban areas in Latin America comes from
smaller cities, and towns rather than from open country.
40For example, see Joan M . Nelson, "The Urban Poor : Disruption
or Political Integration in Third World Cities," World Politics, No . 3
(April , 1970) , 397-399.
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For example, in Santiago, Chile , two-thirds of a sample of
economically active migrants were born in towns of 1 0 , 000 or over.
Only a seventh had been born in places of less than 1 , 000.

41

Also

among migrants to six Brazilian cities (excluding immigrants from
abroad) , 23 percent came from other large cities , 56 percent said
their place of origin was a small city or town , and 21 percent were
from clearly rural places . 4 2

I n Peru the migration trend i s generally

from the rural mountain areas to-relatively important towns in the
large valleys of the Andes , and from there perhaps on to Lima.

43

Gino

Germani, in analyzing a small urban area on the outskirts of Buenos
Aire s , Argent ina , found that only about 15% of the migrants to this
urban district (Isla Maciel) had lived in areas having a population
of less than 2�000.

In addition more than one-third of the migrants

had been born in medium-sized towns of 2 , 000 to 20 , 000 inhabitants,
and 50 percent in large towns . 44

More evidence along this same. line

might be presented, but the preceding seems representative enough to
indicate a general trend .
Those migrants who do jump directly from farm to metropolitan
center tend to come from not too distant villages .

A case in point is

the largely migrant working class barrio (El Carmen) in Bogota,
4 1Herrick, op. cit . , 53 , 103.
42

The secondary source here is Joan M. Nelson, Occasional Paper
No. 2 2 , op. cit . , 1 1 , and she cites from Bertram Hutchinson, "The
Migrant Population of Urban Brazil ," America Latina , 6 : 2 (1963 ) , 43-44.
43

J . Matos Mar , "The ' barriados' of Lima : an example of integration
into urban life," in Philip M . Hauser (ed . ) , Urbanization in Latin
America, (New York: International Documents Service , 1961) , 173 .
44

G . Germani , "Inquiry into the Social Effects of Urbanization in
a Working-Class Sector of Greater Buenos Aires," in Hauser , op. c it . ,
212.
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Colombia where 60 percent of the migrants were from rural areas .
Here approximately 67 percent of the in-migrants traveled 100 miles
or less while only 4 percent were born '.")0 miles or more from
Bogota .
Table 8
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Distance Traveled by In-Migrants to Barrio El
Carmen, Bogota , Colombia
Miles

Frequency

0-50
51-100
101-150
151-200
201-250
250 o r more
TOTAL

Percentage

31
41
17
12
2
3

29.3
38 . 7
16.0
11.3
1.9
2.8

106

100.0

Also , according to Flinn, six other barrios studied in Bogota
by the City Planning Off ice further emphasized that most moves cover
short distances.
What is important is that villages and towns not too far from
maj or metropolitan centers are likely to be heavily exposed to mass
media, government activity , urban consumer good s , and other urban influences .

Moreover , those who move to the city from nearby villages are

likely to maintain ties with friends and relatives left behind , and
4 5William L . Flinn, Rural to Urban Migration:
A Colombian Case,
Research Publication No . 19 (University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center
July 1966) , 2 3 .

to return for visits on fa�ily occa s ions. and holidays , thereby both
reinforce their own rural ties and introducing urban influences t o
the village.
Another difficult adjustment problem the migrant has is said to
come from the high degree of social isolation he suffers.

This too

may be exaggerated in that it appears that the great maj ority of
migrants do have some contacts in the city when they arriv e .

Among

the migrants to two adjacent working class neighborhoods , that Gino
Germani surveyed in Buenos Aires , 81 percent found friends or relatives or both upon arrival , and 60 percent received assistance in
finding housing, work, or lllOney to tide them over the first days .

46

A survey of migrants in Santiago, Chile, found that 83 percent had
friends or family in the city or received.assistance in settling.

47

Ninety-two percent of the migrants in a Bogota squatter settlement
had contacts on arriva1 . 48

Andrew Pearse, in a study of urbanization

in the city of Rio de Janeiro, also found evidence similar to the pre
ceding . 49
There are other socio-psychological variables, also , which some
"urban-instability" theorists propose as factors affecting migrant
political attitudes.

Many concentrate on the deterioration of nuclear

family and extended family bonds as one inescapable consequence of
46
47

Germani in Hauser, o p . cit . , 213-214 .
Herrick, op. cit . , 9 1 .

48
49

Flinn, op . cit . , 2 7 .

see Andrew Pearse, "Some Characteristics o f Urbanization in the
City of Rio de Janeiro , " in Hauser , op. c i t . , 199 .
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integration into the urban industrial culture .

As early as 1952, how-

ever, Oscar Lewis presented evidence that, at least in the case of
Mexico, s trong family and kinship ties were wholly compatible with
urban life and industrialization.

50

Lewis ' subsequent work in this

are a , based on a much wider sample of migrant families, served to
corroborate these early observations and showed that migrant family
life in Mexico City remained quite stabl e , and that extended family
ties increased rather than d.e creased.
Despite previous urban exposure , friends and relatives, and
continued family ties, some of the newcomers undoubtedly do feel more
or less uprooted and isolate d .

Howeve r > the point i s that the picture

of their plight should not be overdrawn.

Evidence which is presently

available to this writer suggests that the maj ority of new urban
dwellers do not experience great problems in socio-psychological
adjustment to their new environment .

Thus , it does not appear that

the socio-psychological factor is particularly important in producing
political radicalization among the migrants.
Primary to the migrant theories is the assumption that the migrants are disappointed and frustrated by economic conditions in the
city.

Again the evidence regarding the present situation does not

bear out this assumption.

Survey findings are almost unanimous on

the point that most migrants consider themselves better off , and
probably are in fact better off , than they were before they moved .
50oscar Lewi s , "Urbanization Without Breakdown : A Case Study , " in
Dwight B . Heath and Richard N . Adams > (eds . ) , Contemporary Cultures and
Societies of Latin America , (New York: Random House , 1965), 424-437.

31
Looking first at employment , most migrants seem to find jobs
fairly quickly.

(See Table 9) .

The high proportions finding work

so soon suggest that many migrants have jobs lined up before they
arrive .
Table 9

51

Time Required for Migrants to Find First Job in City

City

Sample

Santiago ,
Chile

Buenos Aires

Brazil : six cities
(includes Rio and
Sao Paulo)

Percent Finding
Work Within :

310 economically active
migrants arriving in
Santiago within previous
decade . Roughly 40 percent white collar.

4 0 percent

446 residents of a
"villa miseria" ,
mostly recent migrant s ,
61 percent day laborers
or unskilled workers.

74 percent

2 weeks

85

1 month

5250 adult s , including
3035 migrants of whom
1483 sought j obs on
arrival .

80 percent
95 (male)
90 (female)

1 month
4 months
4 months

2 days

63

1 month

80

6 months

Surveys consistently show lower rates of open unemployment among
migrants than among native urbanites .

This is true for city-wide or

more limited surveys in Bogota and Santiago (See Table 10) .
51

Germani ,

Reproduced from Nelson , Occasional Paper N o . 2 2 , op . cit . , 15 .
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in his study of a working-class sector of Buenos Aires, draws similar
Table 1052
Chile:

Unemployment as a Percentage
of the Labor Force

Outside Santiago
1960
Group

Greater Santiago
1963
Group

Natives

Migrants·

Men

7 . 1%

Men

7 . 2%

4 . 6%

Women

4 . 6%

Women

4 . 9%

3 .1%

conclusions.

In his survey 5 percent of the males above the age of

14 in his city-born group were found to be unemployed; in the other two
groups (one composed of marginal migrant s and one of recent migrants)
the figure was 2 or 3 percen� .

Twenty-one percent of the women in the

recent migrant group were gainfully employed , while the proportion was
lower among the native-born women . 53
From the standpoint of the migrant' s own personal satisfaction,
which is most important in determining the extent of his frustrations,
it seems less important to determine how his economic situation compares with those of natives than whether he has , or at least believes
he has, improved his situation by moving .
52
Herrick, op . cit . , 84 .
53Germani in Hauser, op . cit . , 220.

Generally the migrant
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believes he has improved his situation by moving to the city.

54

Although this evidence is fragmentary, it seems to indicate consistently
for a number of cities that most migrants who seek employment find it
r�asonably quickly .

Moreover, the great majority find their new work an im-

provement over their positions before moving , in terms of working conditions
and , less uniformly, status and earnings.

Thus while there obviously is some

frustration among some migrants to Latin America ' s cities, the amount is
apparently a great deal less than the "economic frustration" theorists would
have us believe.
Among those few migrants who are both disappointed and bitter, there
is little reason to expect them to express their frustration politically.
Instead the migrants may turn their anger inward in withdrawal and defeat;
they may beat their wives or quarrel with their neighbors ; they may seek
oblivion in alcohol or solace in religion.

On this last point , Bryan Roberts ,

in his study of Protestant groups in Guatemala City, describes one Protestant who felt a life-long hostility to the power of the military and landowners.

According to Roberts the man gave thanks to God that he had become

a ?rotestant , since, he said , this had made him realize the irrelevance of
suffering in this world and had prevented him from losing his life in futile
attacks on the governments -of the day. 55

Thus in many cases Protestant

54For example , see Henry Dietz , "Urban Squatter Settlements in Peru: A
Case History and Analysis ," Journal of Inter-American Studies , (July, 1969) ,
359 ; and Germani in Hauser, op. cit . , 223 .
55Bryan R. Rober t s , "Protestant Groups and Coping with Urban Life in ·
Guatemala City ," American Journal of Sociology, 73 (May , 1968) , 759. If
.
interested in this aspect , also see E. Willen s , "Protestantism and Cultural
Change in Brazil and Chile , 11 in William D . Antonio and Frederick Pike (eds . ) ,
Religion, Revolution, and Reform (New York: Frederick A . Prager , Inc . , 1964 ) ;
and Ivan Vallier , "Religious Elites : Differentiations and Developments in
Roman Catholicism" , in S . M . Kipset (ed . ) , Elites in Latin America (New York:
Oxford University Press , 1967) , lSJ-223; and June Nash , "Protestantism in the
Highlands of Western Guatemala" (unpublished manuscript) , cited in Nathan L .
Whetten, Guatemala: The Land and the Peopl e , (New Haven, Conn: Yale University
Press , 1961) .
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and Catholic groups in Latin America may withdraw the frustrated
migrant from overt participation in urban politics.
In addition to the preceding list of individual reactions , there
are many associational responses with little or no political relevance.
The of ten overlooked point is that political actio�� whether individual
or associational , moderate or extremi s t , legal or illega l , is only one
class of reactions to frustration among many others .
Moreover, the more recent a migrant ' s arrival in the city, the
less likely he is to translate frustration over economic conditions (or
any other problem) into political action.

Those migrants who come directly

from rural areas are likely to have little political interest or aware
ness,

56

and may bring with them ingrained attitudes of fatalism and habits

of deference to authority which inhibit ideological rebellion against the
status quo . 57

A t any rate, it seems quite unlikely that the disappointed

migrants will vent their frustration through political channels .

58

The preceding lengthy discussion leads us to conclude that the
migrants' political behavior is not primarily a reflection of the trauma
of migration.

It seems much more likely to assume that the political

socialization which the migrant experiences through urban residence is
56
wayne Cornelius, in studying migrants to Mexican metropolitan
areas notes that an analysis of survey data indicates that a majority of
these migrants grew up in nearly rural areas and came directly to the
big city. He also notes these same migrants display very low levels of
political awareness . Cornelius's evidence concerning this point will
be presented in the next chapter .
57

For example , see Soares in Horowi t z , op . cit . , 193-194.

58
Nelson, Occasional Paper No . 2 2 , o p . cit . , 45 .
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more important in shaping his pol'itical behavior than are the often
assumed widespread psychological characteristics of anomie and frustration.
Glaucio Soares proposes that the process of migrant radicalization
is dependent upon the race between urbanization, which heightens the
level of aspirations for increasing numb ers of people, and industriali
zation, which satisfies them.

59

He cites two extreme cases in Brazil

where urbanization proceeds at a faster rate than industrialization,
Recife and Rio de Janeir o .

According t o Soares, in 1945 and 1947 the

Communist Party had its greatest successes in these two cities .

60

However , his findings do not indicate the percentage of migrants (those
with ten or less years of residence) in these cities that voted Communist.
Moreover , most of the evi�ence presented by Soares suggests that among
the unskilled migrants in Brazil the propensity to engage in radical
action increases as the period of urbanization lengthens.

Thia leads

one to wonder if perhaps there is not some validity to the radical · marginal theory .

(This theory relates to migrants with more than ten years

of urban residenc e . )
The Radical Marginals : Theory
Proponents of this theory state that the "demonstration effect" of
concentrated buying power and highly conspicious forms of consumption
in urban areas makes the migrant who still ekes out a marginal existence
59Glaucio Soares, "The Political Sociology of Uneven Development in
Brazil," in Irving L . Horowitz , (ed . ) , Revolution in Brazil (New York:
E . P . Dutton and Co . , Inc . , 1964 ) , 195 .
60ibid.
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increasingly conscious of his low status in society.

As a result

cognitive mechanisms of relative deprivation are set into operation.

61

Essentially there is a discrepancy between the marginal's present ex
perience and the outcome of anticipated upward mobility .

62

Feelings

of relative deprivation according to the theory , lead to alienation;
and as the years go by this alienation increases and begins to find
expression through radical political activity.
Recently there has arisen a "second generation theory" which is
a modified version of the radical marginal theory.

For example Talton

Ray, writing about Venezuelan "barrio" youths in their teens and early
twentie s , notes :
"Several factors work against their adopting to their
barrio status. They have grown up , for the most part,
in the cities and are not aware of how much less
satisfactory life in the countryside can be . Their
education is more advanced than their elders . As
barrio residents , they have had far more exposure to
the world of party politics than their parents had
at the same age. A significant number have already
had experience in taking political action, and the
parties that have given them this experience usually
are not the traditional parties
Their situation
will seem worse to them than it was to their parents .
As a generation they will be more aware of what they
want and what they do not have. Although they should
be more qualified for employment , they will still find
it very difficult to secure
They will b e more
alert to their political strength and L ! means avail
able for voicing their demands . 1 1 63 ,
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

..

61 G . Soares, "The Politics of Uneven Development : The Case of
Brazil," in S . M . Lipset and Stein Rokkan (ed . ) , Party Systems ' and
Voter Alignments : Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press,
1967 ) , 488-489; and Soares and Hamblin, op. cit . , 1055-105 6 .
62
Don R. Bowen, e t . al . , Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation
Toward Protest of the Urban Poor", American Behavioral Scientist,
(March-April, 1968) , 23 .
.
Talton Ray, The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela (Berkeley,
1968) , 281-282.
63
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To the extent that the radical marginal theory is valid , its
impl ications are far-reaching .

In nearly all of Latin America large

and growing parts of the urban population have long experience in
the city, but have not found a secure niche in the urban economic and
social system.

Thus the theory ' s predictions of turbulence and extre

mism appear to be highly relevant and disturbing .

However, despite

its obvious importance , this theory unfortunately remains virtually
untested; and, therefore, its validity remains questionable .
The Radical Marginals : Evidence
Among the bits of evidence that are available concerning this
theory, there appear to be problems of definition and interpretation.
The primary problem stems from devising an adequate index of radicalism.
Even where voting data are available and the party system includes a
party which is both legal and clearly radical , it may be misleading to
equate support for this party in any single election with a sustained
radical orientation.

Survey questions which probe for radical senti

ment are likely to produce evasive replies, hence resort to indices
which do not alarm respondents , but also do not measure radicalism
very wel l .
Glaucio Soares ' survey o f class identification and political
affiliation in Rio de Janeir o , which provides part of the evidence
for his radical marginal theory, illustrates these problems .

The

survey, conducted in 1960, covered a cross-section of all classes and
included two hundred sixty-eight skilled and unskilled manual workers.
From this sample Soares found that "radicalism" measured in terms of

38
support for the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) was highest among unskilled -(marginal) laborers wl

.,ad long urban experience .

His

data are summarized in the following :
64
Table 6
Radicalism Among Manual Workers , Rio , 1960
Skill Level

Length of Urban Residence
Less than 20 Years

More than 20 Years

Percent
for PTB

Percent
for PTB

Sample
Size

Sample
Size

Skilled workers

38

(92)

37

(72)

Unskilled workers

32

(62)

so

(42)

The data present a couple of problems.

First, there is the question

of interpreting support for the Brazilian Labor Party as evidence of
radical sentiment.

An

expressed preference for the PTB certainly indi-

cates interest in social reform, but falls well short of implying desire
for a radical transformation of the social, economic, and political
systems .

Second , Soares did not test his findings against controls for

differences in education, ·age , or other variables which might be masked
by skill level, and which might be partly or largely responsible for
his result s .
Joan Nelson' s interpretation of data from the study by Alex Inkeles
and his associates of the impact of factory experience on workers '
attitudes lends somewhat greater support to the radicalization theory.
For this study, surveys were conducted among large samples of factory
64
soares in Horowitz , o p . cit . , 192.

39
workers and smaller control groups of urban non-industrial workers
and of cultivators in six developing nations .
did not inquire into party preferences .

The Inkeles surveys

However, in Argentina res-

pondents were asked what kind of social and economic change was
desirable in their country - rapid and drastic change , moderate
change , no change , or a return to the earlier days.

Miss Nelson

constructed a three-point scale from replies on two such questions .
Table 7 shows the pattern which emerges if respondents are grouped
by skill and occupation, and by degree of urban experience .

Mean

scores on the radicalism scale are compared across these group s .
Table 7

65

Radicalism and Urban Experience in Argentina (Mean scores on
"radicalism scale" : high figure indicates more "radical" :
Possible range 1-3) .
Skill/Occupations

Unskilled factory workers
Semi-skilled factory
workers
Skilled factory workers
Low-level non-factory
workers
Higher-level non-factory
workers

Sample
Size

58
421

Years Urban Since Age 15
Urbanborn

Avg.

1. 75
1 . 92

2 . 09
1 . 98

1 . 88
1 . 84

1 . 56
a

2 . 13
2.40

2 . 07
2 . 33

2 . 35

2 . 39

0-4

5-11

12 or
more

1 . 17
1 . 35

1. 75
1 .65
1 . 86
a

110
24

a

23

a

a

a /Mean scores based on 1 or 2 respondents have been omitted from table .

Examining only the three migrant categories, unskilled and semi-skilled
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migrant factory workers seem to become more "radical" with longer
urban experienc e , while skilled workers become less disposed to
However , there is at

radical change as they gain urban experience.

least one significant weakness with this data also.

The questions

comprising the scale measure receptivity to rapid social change and
the recognition of need for such change, but they leave open the
political means of bringing about such change.
Problems with the Radical Marginal Theory
The primary problem lies not with the broad outlines of the
marginal theory, but with its failure to consider rates and leakage s .
I f expectations rise more slowly than aspirations , and i f small improve
ments are felt as real progress, or if the society is viewed as essen
tially open despite individual disappointments , then frustration may
grow more slowly than the theorists assume .

If political awareness

spreads gradually , discontinuously, and unevenly among the urban poor;
if the connection between political awareness and political action is
less automatic and more influenced by the political and social setting
than the theory implies; and if the urban poor are less disposed to
blame the government for their troubles than are the more privileged ,
then the likelihood that frustration will be channeled into political
protest is reduced regardless of the level of frustration.

A great

deal of discontent will leak out of the political system into other,
apolitical responses.
One of the basic premises of the marginal theory is that , as the
years go by, the marginals ' aspirations for material well-being will

41
continue t o rise at a higher rate than their ability t o satisfy them.
Housing can certainly be considered a major component of material wellbeing .

In Argentina, urban workers were shown photographs of several

different grades of housing .

They were asked both to identify the

picture most like their current house , and to indicate the kind of
house they would like in order to really be satisfied.

By numbering

each grade of housing , from poorest to best, the "housing aspiration
gap" between an individual ' s desired and current housing can be calculated .

(See Table 11) .

Looking at all migrants as a group , the

housing aspiration gap narrows steadily with longer urban residence.
Table 11

66

Urban Experience and Housing Satisfaction

Country

Index

Argentina
Mean score on "gap" scale
{Possible range 1-7 : high
score indicates dissatisfaction
Percent satisfied with
current housing (no gap)

Years Urban Since Age 15
0-4

5-11

12 or more

3 . 17

2 . 72

2 . 25

14

34

43

Some of the other indices used to measure the aspiration gap do
correlate positively, indicating that a gap does exist ; howeve r , in·
66Joan M . Nelson, uMigrants , Urban Poverty , and Instability in
Developing Nations , Harvard Center for International Affairs , Occasional
Paper No . 22 (Cambridge , Mass. 1969) , 4 0 .
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almost all cases, the evidence shows that the gap does not widen
particularly rapidly.

For example one survey shows that in Argentina

and Chile , as urban experience increases, workers in all categories
except the semi-skilled become less content with their j o b s , in roughly
the same degree.

67
Table 12

68

Skill Level , Urban Experience , and Job Satisfaction
(Mean Score on Job Satisfaction:

High

Score Indicates Satisfaction
Possible Range (1-4)

Country and skill / occupation

Argentina
Unskilled factory worker
Semi-skilled factory worker
Skilled factory worker
Chile
Unskilled factory worker
Semi-skilled factory worker
Skilled factory worker
Low-level non-factory worker
High-level non-factory worker

Sample Size

(58)
(417)
(109)

(163)
(228)
(292)
(55)
(45 )

Years Urban Since Age 15
0-4

5-11

12 or more

3 . 67
3.42
4 . 00

2.81
3 . 23
3 . 33

2 . 75
3 . 38
3 . 11

0-2

3-10

11 or more

3 . 00
2 . 64
3 . 44
4 . 00

2 .80
2 . 91
3 . 07
2 . 46
3 . 60

2 . 68
2 . 89
3 . 04
3 . 00
3 . 00

Actual accomplishments and the value the poor themselves place on
these accomplishments are also crucial in determining the size of the
total gap between aspirations and achievement and the resultant degree
67
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of frustration.
a better j ob .

A sense of achievement may reflec t , for exampl e ,
In this respect , the radicalization theory tacitly

assumes substantial occupational immobility at the lowest levels of
urban society .

This can be tested with data on occupational mobility

between generations .

Among men whose fathers were unskilled or semi-

skilled manual workers , what proportion are themselves at these lowest
steps on th' occupational ladder?

Table 13 shows the occupational

Table 13 69
Occupational Mobility of Men Whose Fathers Were Unskilled
(Fathers are Marginals)
Sao Paul o , Brazil
Occupational level of sons

(1960)
Percent

Buenos Aires,
Argentina
(1960)
Percent

1.

Unskilled manual domestic,
vendors .

31 . 2

21 . 1

2.

Semi-skilled and skilled manual
workers , including supervisory
manual grades .

42 . 0

52.6

3.

Lower-level non-manual, includ
ing supervisors , shop and office
clerks .

12.1

21.1

4.

Higher-level non-manual and
owners of medium-small busi
nesses.

8.6

2.3

5.

Administrative and executive
posts; owners of medium-large
stores and factories.

3.0

2 .9

6.

High professional and adminis
trative posts.

3.0

o.o
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levels reached by men whose fathers were unskilled, in large samples
drawn in Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires.

The table clearly shows that in

both cities a maj ority of those born into the bottom strata rose out
of

them.

Most became skilled manual workers , but substantial fractions

found their way into lower - or higher - level non-manual j ob s , and a
few broad-jumped into higher administrative, business, or professional
positions .
In addition the preceding study may understate the extent of
upward mobility for urban lower-class groups .

Broad occupational cate

gories conceal a substantial range within each category in job prestige ,
security, pay, and working conditions.

Many men who , like their

fathers, hold unskilled jobs may nevertheless have made some progress
in their own and others ' j udgment

•.

These fragmentary observations on progress within and movement out
of the lowest economic strata do not suggest a rosy picture .

They do ,

howeve r , indicate that modest occupational mobility is fairly widespread.
In summation it may be said that neither the aspiration nor the achieve
ment gap is nearly as wide as most frustration theorists imply ; and,
therefore, the total aspiration-achievement gap is much narrower than
often assumed .

Consequently the extent of frustration, particularly

that vented through political channe l s , is not as great as might be
expected.
In fact , resort to political modes of expression and action is
less likely among the poor and ill-educated (for example , among the
marginals) than among more advantaged groups .

Survey research at all

levels is most consistent in pointing to the relationship between level

45
of education and degree of interest , sense of efficacy, and extent
o f actual participation in political and public affairs.

70

More

evidence relating to this preceding statement will be presented in
the next chapte r .
One might conclude then that the marginal radicalization theory,
in contrast to the myth of the disruptive migrants , is probably overstated rather than wrong .
theorie s .

This much cannot be said for the migrant

If there remains any doubt concerning this point, more

evidence may be gathered to substantiate it by simply focusing on the
city itself as the unit of analysi s .

For example, in Barrio El Carmen

on the edge of Bogota, a squatter settlement improved to the point
where three-fourths of the houses were one- or two-story brick with
sheet metal roofs; "the overwhelming maj ority

•

•

•

•

stated that their

housing , sanitation facilitie s , income , medical service , and educational
opportunities for the children were better in the barrio than in their
previous countryside residences.
to their area of origin."

71

Few expressed any desire to return

Obviously, for the recent migrant , whose

only basis of comparison is his area of origin, the city, at least
initially , will appear relatively attractive to him.
Finally it should be noted that a basic assumption for political
radicalization and resulting instability is a high incidence of group
violence .

In this respe c t , even though the unit of analysis is too

7°
For example, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba , The Civic
Culture , 8 7 , 94 , 121 , 152 .
71
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large to draw any specific conclusions, the following evidence
concerning group violence calculated at a national level merits
presentation.
Table 14

72

The Rural-urban Dichotomy and
Group Violence

Country

Number of Deaths
from group Violence 1950-1962

Rank

Percent of
Population
in Farming

Percent of
Population
in Cities
Over
2 0 , 000

Bolivia

663

4

72

19.4

Colombia

316

6

55

22.4

Argentina

217

8

25

48.5

Honduras

111

10 . 5

66

11.5

25

21

54

33.1

Panama

With the exception o f Argentina , the above table indicates a
significant correlation between deaths from mass violence and numbers
of people engaged in farming activities.

Such highly urbanized nations

as Uruguay, Brazil , and Mexico have not had a significant enough num
ber of deaths due to group violence to be listed in the table.
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Ob-

viously other variables, such as the nature of the national political
72Horowitz in Beyer , op . cit . , 241.
73
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system, are important in determining the amount of group violenc e ,
and it is thus impossibl e to generalize from this evidence .

However,

it does raise some serious questions about the validity of theories ,
such as those which have been discussed , which propose that the
urban complex is a center for political radicalism.
In this chapter , the emphasis has been primarily on economic
and socio-psychological factors and their bearing on the political
radicalization process.

The case studies which will be presented in

the following two chapters will focus on factors such as political
awareness and behavior which have not, thus far, been well examined .
It is, perhap s , unfortunate that the primary index for political
behavior will be voting .

(The shortcomings of the voting index as a

predictor of radicalism hav� already been pointed out. l However,
because of the lack of reliable data, this writer is presently unable
to construct a better index to measure politically disruptive be
havior .

Chapter III .
The Politics of Mexico ' s
New Urban Masses
While studying the Mexican rural-urban migrant and his attitudes
and behavior with respect to politically disruptive activity, the
emphasis will be placed on political, rather than economic, social
or psychological factors which influence radical tendencies.

Al

though the migrants ' problems regarding economic assimilation and
socio-psychological adjustment will be briefly treated , the focus
will be on measuring migrant political alienation which often leads
to resulting political radicalization.

In pursuit of this objective,

it will be necessary to examine the Mexican political party process
(since opposition party preference and voting will serve as two of
the primary indices to measure political radicalism) and its impact
on the urban environmen t .

First , in order to provide the proper

setting for our discussion, it might be helpful to briefly examine
recent urbanization trends in Mexico .
Since 1900, Mexican urban communities have grown at a faster
rate than has the entire country.

Between 1940 and 1950, urban areas

with more than 1 0 , 000 inhabitants showed a growth rate of 73 per
cent as compared with approximately 31 percent for the country as a
whole .

In 1921, 68.8 percent of the population lived in communities
48
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of fewer than 2 , 500 persons.

In 1930, this was reduced to 6 6 . 5% to

57% in 1950, and estimates in 1960 indicate that almost one-half of
Mexico ' s population is urban.
nearly 70% will be urbanites.
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It is further estimated that by 1980
Mexico ' s high rate of natural popu-

lation growth (about 3 . 8% per annum in 1967 and 1968) has, of course,
been an important factor in urban expansion.

Of far greater impor-

tance, however, is the movement of population from the countryside
into the cities, which reached torrential proportions in the 19501960 period, when over 2 . 4 million persons participated in the exodus
from rural life.
Population pressure on the rural , exhausted, arable land has been
a basic cause of the mass rural-to-urban migration in Mexico .

This is

reinforced by the lure of economic opportunity in the cities.

An

institutional cause of this migration relates to agrarian reform and
the program of ejidos or collective farms .

Reform is designed to

break up great land holdings through systematic donation of lands to
peasant farmers .

Apparently the extensive reform bureaucracy has been

in league to some extent with corrupt local politicians who are fleecing
peasants of their harvest profits.

As a result many of the disillusioned

peasants are moving to the city to escape this exploitation .
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inter-state migration has originated in the six centrally-located
states comprising the Mexican Baj io , a semi-arid agricultural region
where population pressure on the land has been most sever e .

Long

distance migration has been concentrated overwhelmingly in a few large
streams running from the centrally-located states to the Mexico City
(Federal District) metropolitan area and the North Pacific (Baja
California) region.

During the 1950-1960 period the population of

the Federal District grew to over five million inhabitants , and grow
ing at an annual rate of 7 . 2 percent , its population is expected to
top the seven million mark by 1970.

The impact of migration on the

capital ' s expansion can be gauged from the fact that over 37 percent
of the people in the District in 1960 had migrated from elsewhere in
the nation since 1950.
The Mexican Migrant ' s Adjustment to Urban Living
The case of Mexico provides additional evidence concerning the
economic and social frustration theories which propose that the new
urban dweller has to face serious adjustment problems .
From the economic standpoint , there is some evidence that material
deprivation in Mexican urban areas is not as serious as might be
expected given the massive influx of new residents from the country
sice.

Harley L . Browning , working with a sample of the 1960 Mexican

census of the Federal District, found that contrary to expectations ,
migrants , those born outside the Federal District, do not differ
greatly in most respects from the native population in socioeconomic
characteristics.

He concludes that when standard of living indicators
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are taken from the census data (availability of running water in
households, sewage facilities, separate bathroom s , ownership of
radio and TV) there is virtually no difference between the migrants
and the natives.

77

Respondents in Joseph Kahl ' s Measurement of

Modernism survey were asked to comment on the adequacy of social
welfare services available to them in the Federal District.

As

the following . data indicate, migrant evaluations were significantly
more positive than those metropolitans (the latter defined as those
respondents living in Mexico City who had been living in large - cities
at the age of 10) :

78

Migrants
Very good
Fair
Poor

Metropolitans

31%
52%
18%

22%
47%
32%

The conclusion then is that widespread service deprivation and
deteriorating overall conditions of life for the in-migrant population are more often assumed than demonstrated .
It is reasonable to assume that successful economic assimilation
depends in large part upon the migrant ' s capacity to display salable
productive skill s .

This in turn depends on his premigration pre-

paration: his education and work experience .

Among the newly-
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arrived migrants in Cornelius ' s Civic Culture sample

79

(those with

under two years of urban residence) , 70% had attained some level of
primary education (up to six years of schooling) , and among the
migrants as a whole , 69% had achieved a primary education or higher.
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It would thus appear that the bulk of migrants arriving in Mexican
urban centers possess at least the basic educational equipment which
would enable them to learn productive skills in the post-migration
period .
If we do not perceive an objective economic basis for the "frustration gap " , which is often hypothesized as characteristic of the
situation of the migrant , there is still a need to examine his subj ective evaluation of that situation.
Table 1581

The data in Table 15 show

Expectations of Future Economic

Improvement among Migrants and Urban-Born
Migrants by Length of Urban
Residence (in years) .

All
Migrants

UrbanBorn

Expectation

0-2

2-4

5-9

10-19

20 or
more

Improve

57%

54%

65%

58%

54%

57%

64%

Stay the Same

27

25

18

15

12

17

16

Get Worse

11

6

8

14

14

. 12

9

5

15

8

13

20

14

10

Don ' t Know
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a positive expectation of achieving family economic improvement among
57% of the cases in Cornelius ' s Civic Culture migrant sample.
Certainly there is little here to support the notion of widespread
and deep frustration of expectations among migrants in Mexico.
Other adjustment problems the migrants ' are reported to have are
of a socio-psychological nature.

The deterioration of the nuclear

family is of ten postulated as an inescapable consequence of integration
into the urban environment .

However, as was observed in the previous

chapter, there is evidence that in Mexico strong family ties are wholly
compatible with city life. 82
A potentially more important factor in determining socio-psychological
adjustment is that of anomie :
to a changed situation.

the lack of stable cognitive orientations

Cornelius presents evidence which shows that

the migrants in his sample tend to be only slightly more anomic than
the urban born.
significant .
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In fact the differences are not even statistically

Furthermore, the contention that "migration may produce

anomie, but only in the long run , " since it may take considerable time
for migrants to lose traditional norms and values carried over from
rural life, is not confirmed by Cornelius ' s evidence either .

In fact ,

the data indicate that participation in religious observance s , social
trust , and sense of social cohesion tend to increase among migrants
with longer residence in the city.
82
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In conclusion, it may be said that the case study of Mexico presents further evidence supportive of this writer ' s hypotheses I and II.
That is , there is much less economic frustration and there are far
fewer socio-psychological adjustment problems among the new urban
dwellers than some "urban-instability" theorists would have us believe.
The New Urbanite and Politics
There are, of course , some general problems involved in studying
p<iliticization and political alienation in Latin America;
the case of Mexico offers some really unique obstacles.

85

however,

For example,

any attempt to utilize Mexican electoral data for the study of political alienation is at once frustrated by the peculiar character of the
country ' s political system--its virtual "one-party" structure which
denies opposition groups recognition in honest elections .
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For this

reason it is necessary to redefine political alienation specifically
for the Mexican case.
In Mexico , political alienation will be understood to mean a
specific and identifiable syndrome of ideology and behavior which is
manifest in support for, sympathy toward, or participation in political
extremism.

This , in turn, is defined as advocacy of violence , advocacy

of a conspiratorial interpretation of Mexican political life ( including
the doctrine that the political system is manipulated by hostile foreign
85 For example, see Daniel Goldrich, "Toward the Comparative Study
of Politicization in Latin America , " in Heath and Adams , op. cit . , 361-378.
86
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powers or by a treasonable internal cabal) , advocacy of the relegation
of the Mexican government or its maj or subdivisions to private enterprise or to the Roman Catholic Church, or advocacy of the total abandon
ment of constitutional government.

87

Obviously this definition is

constructed to fit right-wing political alienation specifically ; however , it could easily be modified to indicate left-wing alienation
also.

88

With this understanding it is possible to proceed with a

discussion of Mexican politics from the urban perspective , and then
hopefully relate this specifically to the new urban dweller by focusing
on his political attitudes and behavior.
Mexican politics:

an overview .

Since 1929 , governmental offices

in Mexico have been dominated by the Partido Revolucionario Institutional
(PRI) , and its predecessors .

89

It has only one serious rival , the

Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN) .

This semi-conservative rival party

often competes for congressional and local offices and the Presidency,
but has had few victories.

90

Its unofficial, but allegedly real, link-

ages with the disenfranchised Roman Church and with the Mexican upperclass have made the PAN unacceptable to many proletarian groups who pay
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homage to the popular reform program of the Revolutionary party.

91

The PRI has been able to maintain mass support for its candidates through
the organizations of its labor , agrarian, and popular sectors . 92
Historically , Mexican political tradition has not embraced the
ideal of a loyal opposition in the usual Anglo-American meaning.

This

point was dramatically illustrated by the uncertainty as to whether
elected panistas would take their seats in the national Camara de
Diputados after the 1958 elections .

Ultimately and with

dif f i-

culty, elected opposition candidates from Ensenada , Distrito Federal,
Michoaccan, San Luis Potosi , Chihuahua , and Colima did take their
seats.
According to Kenneth Johnson the growing strength of opposition
party politics in Mexico is directly tied to . urbanization.

Johnson

noted that interviews with leaders of the PAN during the summer of 1962
indicated that urbanization favors Mexican opposition parties because
of increased access to individuals and groups which results from urban
clustering. 93

The importance of urbanization in this respect is that

it permits and encourages transmission of political values to persons
who formerly were untouched by political propaganda.
Mexico ' s principal oppo s ition party.

Accion Nacional was born as

a political party in September, 193 9 , at a national convention held in
91
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Mexico City.

Its original principles , couched in ethereal language,

vaguely extolled the inherent dignity of the human person , the state,
order, liberty , education, the right to labo r , private initiative and
property , the urgency of economic and agrarian reform, the the need to
restore municipal government

; its classic role in order to insure

t ..

free political participation and human right s .

Recently , PAN has begun

to focus its appeal in urban areas because of their greater receptivity
potential.
Citing figures to the effect that 50 percent of the dwellings in
the Distrito Federal can be classified , at best, as slums , PAN's platform indicts the Federal Government for its failure to provide decent
housing and for the general slowness of its social welfare program
throughout the country .
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Also, PAN calls for the reform of Articles 3 and 130 of the Con
stitution to give the Church more participation in education.
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The

platform is careful not to mention the church directly but refers in
general to impediments to man ' s religious freedom.
For at least the past ten year s , PAN ' s chief stronghold has been
the northern Mexican states which enj oy a measure of freedom from central control because of their distance from Mexico City.

Although no

reliable voting f igures are available, it is likely that if vot�s were
to be counted honestly, PAN would command significant popular electoral

94Johnson, "Urbanization and Political Change , " o p . cit . , 102.
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maj orities in Chihuahua , Sonora , and Baj a California Norte.
In that it is mainly middle-and-upper-class , conservative, and
church-oriented ,

96

PAN obviously falls outside the guidelines which

this writer has set for a radical opposition party in the Latin American
context .

(See Table 4) .

Thus it cannot be stated that support for

PAN is a reliable indicator of political alienation in Mexico .

However,

there are several factors, at least one of which is unique to the
Mexican situation, which must be considered before drawing any conclusions .

First there is the virtual "one-party" structure in Mexico

which almost by definition makes any viable opposition party a threat
to the stability of that structure.

Second, as we will see later,

leftist groups in Mexico are too fragmented anu disorganized to represent important vehicles for the expression of politically relevant
alienation.

Third, pronouncements of leading panistas such as Louis

H . Alvarez , and Effrain Gonzales Luma and Alej andro Aviles, predicting
popular violence against the established regime , evidence at least a
limited commitment to political radicalism,
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to the extent that panistas

are denied access to governmental and political participation, it may
be said that they are physically and ideologically isolated and alienated .
An

incident in Baja California serves to illustrate the operational

status of the PAJ.� opposition in Mexico .

Prior to the gubernatorial

election of 1959 in Baja California, the incumbent governor , Braulio
96Tucker , op . cit . , 5 9 .
105 .
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Maldonado Sandez , issued a public declaration that strict controls
would be placed upon the polls due to an alleged importation of guns
by PAN from the United States for the purpose of a forcible take-over
of the state government of Baja California.

It was further alleged

that the directives from PAN authorized the seizure of power by any
means ; that Louis H . Alvarez issued these instructions on behalf of
his party and that they were reissued by Hugo Gutierrez Vega and
Salvador Rosas Magallon.

That these charges were improbable is most

likely consicl ering the fact of overwhelming PRI control of the means
of forceful coercion within Mexico.

Informants in Baja California

stated , in personal interviews , that the Governor ' s decision to create
an atmosphere of crisis the day before the election (August 2 , 1959)
was calculated to frighten women voters (who were assumed likely to
be influenced by pro-PAN church propaganda) away from the polls by
fabricating an atmosphere of imminent violenc e .

The PRI officially

declared a 2-1 victory in that election which acknowledged latent
support for PAN among the electorat e .

In view of dishonest vote

counting, PAN support may have been considerable.

98

It appears from this discussion that Mexico presents us with a
unique case where a conservative party is the main vehicle for expressing urban political alienation.

However , before making any final

conclusions it is first necessary to examine other Mexican political
parties and movements which are, at least to some extent , urban oriented .

98 Johnson, "Urbanization and Political Change , " op . cit . ,
106-107 .
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Minority oppo sition parties.

Although PAN is by far the strongest

and most promising of Mexico ' s opposition partie s , it is not the only
organized alternative for expression of political alienation.

There

is a PNN (Partido Nacionalista de Mexico) , which seeks to unite the
Mexican Revolution with Christianity by a comprehensive reins tatement
of the Church.

To the far right of this group is the UNS (Union

Nacional Sinarquista) , a loosely organized group of Catholic fascists
who allegedly perpetrate acts of terror and violence as a means of
discrediting official regime s .

One writer contends that PAN has been

partially coopted into the Mexican single-party system and that UNS
now serves as the principal catalyst for articulation of alienated
restorationist sentiment in Mexico . 99

Although UNS is growing, it is

not yet strong enough to compete with PAN as a politically relevant
rightest alienate.

That i s , the alienation expressed by UNS is not

yet of sufficient magnitude to pose a threat (latent , incipient , or
actual) _to the stability of the Mexican political system.
Practically an adjunct of the controlling party (PRI) is the
PARM (Partido Autentico de la Revolucion Mexicana) , which claims to
be the remaining segment of authentic revolutionary zeal stemming
from the "real" revolution which began under Morelos in 1810.
In addition to these political groupings , there are in Mexico
a number of other formations which call themselves parties and whose
leadership is difficult to ascertain at all times .

Most of these

99Johnson, "Ideological Correlates of Right Wing Political
Alienation in Mexic o , " op . cit . , 661 .
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would be described as left-of-center and include FOR (Federacion
Obrera Revolucionaria) , IL:E (Lirga Leninista Esparataco) , POCM
(Partido Obrero Compesino Mexicano) , and MLN (Movimiento de
Liberacion Nacional) .

The MLN, which is today splintered and

discordant , was created from the impotent Mexican Communist Party
(PCM) , lOO the moderate , often pro-government , Peoples Socialist
Party (PPS) , and the POCM. 101

In June, 1962, Vicente Lombardo

Toledano, the leader of PPS, publicly declared his party no longer
associated with the MLN because of the profound differences between
the two "with respect to the nature of such a movement . 1 1 102

Ob-

viously , it might be concluded that factionalism has been and will
continue to be characteristic of the Mexican lef t .

What then has

caused the failing of the Communists and other leftists in Mexico?
One authority on Latin American Communism states that :
The fundamental reason for the failure of the Communists
to make significant headway in Mexico has undoubtedly
been the fact that they have been busy trying to sell
a foreign revolution to a country which was going
through a fundamental revolutionary change of its own .
In constantly advertising the virtues of a Communist
revolution a la Soviet Union, the Mexican Communists
were not only running counter to the trend of events
in Mexico itself , but were also defying the patriotism
of the Mexican people, for whom their own revolution
3
had become synonomous with present-day Mexico. 10

lOOKarl M . Schmit t , "Communism in Mexico , " Western Political
Quarterly , Vol. 15 (March, 1962) , 112-115 .
101navid T . Garza , "Factionalism in the Mexican Left: The
Frustration of the MLN," Western Political Quarterly , (September ,
1964) , 450.
lO Z ibid . , 451.
10 3

Robert J . Alexander , Communism in Latin America, (New Bruns
wick: Rutgers University Press, 1957) , 348 .
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The Communists have also failed to find themselves a real leader
The nearest proximation, Vicente

who can identify with the masses .

Lombardo Toledano , came from the intellectual class, not from the
military or the workers.

He has lived in opulent style and has never

dared to break with the Government.

As a consequence the workers

have considered him merely another politician, with undertones of
insincerity and opportunism. 104

However , it should be pointed out

that Toledano ' s PPS is probably most significant among the splinter
parties of the left in Mexico .

Toledano has been able to mount some

support in both urban and rural areas through the endorsements of such
popular figures as the artist, David Alfaro Siquieros (currently
incarcerated for a seditious crime known as el delito de dissolucion
social) .

105

Lombardo draws organized support from the UGOCM, a union

of workers and peasants which he founded.

UGOCM has undertaken inva-

sions of private property both rural and urban by paracaidistos or
squatters whose land needs have not been satisfied in Mexico ' s ej ido
program of land reform.
Finally, another important reason that the Communists have failed
in Mexico is that the PRI has been primarily interested in coopting
lef t-wing rather than right-wing dissidence and has thus concentrated
its efforts on the Communists and Socialists.

The PRI wishes to be

regarded as the only legitimate heir to the Mexican Revolution.

In

this sense the dominant party realizes that the conservative groups

·

104

s . W. Washington, "Mexican Resistance to Communism,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36 (April , 1958) , 505 .
105

Johnson, "Urbanization .and Political Chang e , " op . c it . , 1 0 9 .
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which were bitterly opposed to the revolution pose no real threa t .
wing dissidents , however, could challenge the PRI on its own ground .

Left106

If we are to believe the literature available in the United States , then
we might conclude that the PRI s trategy has been successful .

However , it

should be noted that the PRI probably has very tight control over the
literature that goes out of Mexico , and it may be that this writer is
grossly underestimating the potency of the Mexic�n left.

If the latter

is true it is hoped that future researchers will be able to provide a
more balanced analysis in this aspect.
An urban civic protest movement.

Other evidences of alienation in

Mexican urban areas have recently appeared in the form of independent
civic protest movements against established urban regimes .

These groups

have preferred to remain aloof from the established political parties and ,
though protesting abuses of official (PRI) state governments, contain
supporters of PRI , PAN and other parties.

The case of the Derrama del

Chuviscar is significant here for it relates both to political alienation
and to related problems of fiscal mobilization in urban area s .
La Derrama d e Chuviscar , freely translated a s the Reassessment of
Chuviscar , was the beginning of a citizens' movement in the city of
Chihuahua to prevent collection of a special public works assessment by
the municipal and state governments.

On December 31, 1961, the state

government organ, Periodico Oficial, published the text of a decree fixing
the amount of a special assessment to be levied upon the proprietors of

106

Bo Anderson and James D . Cockcro f t , "Control
and Cooptation in
,,
Mexican Politic s , " in Irving L . Horowitz and Josue de Castro and John
Gerass i , (eds . ) , Latin American Radicalism, (New York : Vintage Books ,
1969) , 380.
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urban properties in the Rio Chuviscar area for the purpose of paving
the riverbed , installing urban utilities nearby, and of building bridges.
The property owners contended that the state government originally had
been ceded the land by the federal government and that the state had in
turn sold t12 land for an estimated 33,000,000 pesos .

This price,

according to the property owners , had included the cost of improvements
for which they were now being reassessed . 107
In early January , 196 2 , the property owners of the Chuviscar
neighborhood , now calling themselves the Associacion Civica de Usarios
de Servicios Publicos de Chihuahua (ACUSP) sent several telegrams to the
President of the Republic urging his good off ices in solving the dispute.
The ACUSP finally won relief in May , 1962 , when it successfully sought a
jutio de amparo in the Federal District Court for Chihuahua enj oining
collection of the tax by state or municipal officials . l08
The Chihuahua citizens movement is not an isolated example.

At

the present time another citizens ' movement is getting underway in
Cuernayaca , capital city of Morela s .
The Migrant ' s Role in Mexican Urban Political Alienation.

The

backdoor approach (for example locating institutional sources of political
alienation and linking this alienation to particular groups such as the
new urbanites) which has been utilized by this writer in the preceding

107 Johnson , Kenneth F . , Urbanization and Political Change in Latin
America . P h . D . dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles ,
op . cit . , pgs . 111-112 .
lOS

ibid . , 112 .
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discussion, yields two immediate conclusions .

First, the urban c ivic

protest movement described above was unlikely to have included many
recent migrants because its membership was limited primarily to relatively
well-to-do property owners.

(Of course , this is an isolated case and

may or may not be representative with respect to membership . )

Second ,

Mexico ' s principal opposition party, PAN, is basically middle- and upperclass and· thus unlikely to attract rural-urban migrants , most of which
are unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers .
out the second point .

The following table bears

The total for opposition party preference among

migrants is only four percent compared to ten percent for urban-born.
Furthermore, the voting for an opposition party was considerably higher
among the urban-born (17 percent) than among the migrants (10 percent) .
The following evidence will show that other variables measuring political
alienation and political radicalization also indicate that the migrants
are less radical than the metropolitans and the urban-born.
Migrant politicization.

Levels of migrant politicization are

crucial in determining the condition of stability or instability in
rapidly expanding urban areas.

Before people engage in political action,

radical or otherwise, they must be at least minimally politicized that i s , they must at least perceive the relevance of government to their
lives.

109

But perception must be also accompanied by activity.

Thus

this conception of politicization takes on both a cognitive (or
perceptual) aspect and a behavioral (pr active) aspect. 110

In Table

l09Goldrich in Heath and Adams , op . cit . , 361 .
110oaniel Goldric�, Sons of the Establishment , (Chicago : Rand
McNally, 1966) , 1 1 .
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Table 16111
Alienation and Political Radicalization Measured by
Opposition Party Preference and
Voting in Mexico

Indicator

Migrants by Length of Urban Residence
(in �ears)

All
UrbanBorn

0-2

2-4

5-9

PAN

6%

5%

2%

0

5%

3%

9%

pp

0

0

0

1%

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

1

1

11%

0

4%

15%

10%

17%

10-19

20 or more

All
Migrants

Opposition
party pref erencea

Other
Opposition
party
votingb

a

*
-

Among those expressing a party preferenc e .
(Partido Popular Socialists) .

The PP is not the PPS

b For the candidate of the PAN in the 1958 presidential elections
among those voting . For all practical purposes, "opposition voting"
in 1958 was limited to PAN, since the PP and another splinter
party the PARM, supported the official party ' s candidate for presi
dent . The Communist Party ' s candidate received fewer than 1 0 , 000
write-in votes.
*

Too few cases.

111cornelius, op . cit . , 853 . Also , for an interpretation of
Cornelius ' s findings see Barry A:nes , "Bases of Support for Mexico ' s
Dominant Party , " The American Political Science Review, Vol. 6 4 ,
(March, 1970) , 1 6 6 .
·
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17 we find that among both migrant and urban-born populations less
than half of the respondents have attained even minimal levels of
politicization and that the migrants as a whole exhibit lower cognition than the urban born.
Table 17 112
Politicization:

:.�

..

dicator

Cognitive

Migrants by Length of
Urban Residence (in years)
0-2

2-4

5-9

2%

2%

3%

10-19

All Migrants

UrbanBorn

2o+

Perceived
effect of
national
government
on daily
life.
Great
effect

4%

6%

4%

8%

Some
effect

20

14

32

24

28

25

24

None

78

84

65

72

67

71

68

Examination of the data on a behavioral indicator of politicization
reveals essentially the same pattern.

Furthermore , both cognitive and

behavioral indicators point to the �act that recent migrants (two or
less years residence) are less politicized than the group we might define
as the marginals (five to twenty years residence) .
1 1 2 cornelius, o p . cit . , 848 .

This provides further

68
substantiation for the marginal theory as opposed to the recent
migrant theory.
Table 18

1 13

Politicization: Behavioral

All
Migrant s .

Migrants by Length of
Urban Residence
(in years)

Indicator

Membership
in politically relevant groups
or organizations .

0-2

2-4

5-9

10-19

2%

8%

14%

14%

UrbanBorn

2o+

8%

Legitimacy orientations of migrants .

10%

11%

Perhaps a more important

threat to the stability of the Mexican political system than migrant
politicization levels is the development of nonsupportive , alienated
attitudes and orientations toward the system among the migrant masses.
Cornelius ' s data on legitimacy orientations of rural-urban migrants
in Mexico (Table 19) do not suggest any widely-shared attitude potential
which could provide the basis for political radicalism and instability.
The migrant respondents in general demonstrate a relatively high level
of system affect , in fact, higher in all cases than the urban-born res
pondents . 1

113

14

Again the evidence suggests that the recent migrants (two

Cornelius, op . cit . , 8 4 9 .

1 14
nata on system effect provided by Kahl ' s Measurement of
Modernism survey provide further substantiation for this point .
Cornelius, op . cit . , 850 .

See
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Table 19

115

Legitimacy Orientations
Migrants by Length of
Urban Residence
(in years)

Item

1 . Regards political system as
chief object of
personal pride
as a Mexican.

All
Migrants

UrbanBorn

0-2

2-4

5-9

10-19

2o+

41%

23%

25%

31%

33%

31%

28%

2 . Evaluation of
extent to which
the ideals and purposes of the Mexican Revolution
have been realized .

I

Ideals have been
realized .

26%

36%

38%

17%

19%

23%

21%

Ideals have been
forgotten.

16%

18%

3%

10%

10%

10%

16%

5%

0

3%

8%

5%

5%

5%

Probably happen.

11%

14%

9%

10%

10%

10%

12%

Might happen.

36%

38%

20%

31%

25%

29%

28%

Probably not happen.

39%

36%

39%

35%

39%

37%

43 %•

Don ' t know.

14%

12%

33%

24%

26%

24%

17%

Don ' t know .
3 . "Do you think
that (the official
party ' � policies &
activities would
ever seriously
endanger the nat ' l
welfare?"

115 corne liu s , op. cit . , 851
'

•
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or less years of residence) are more supportive o f t9e political
system than the marginals .
Suppo r t for protest demonstrations .

In order to evaluate the

extent to which non-supportive legitimacy orientations and feelings
of alienation are translated into action we may examine support for
opposition movements and demonstrations .

(Evidence concerning support

for oppositipn parties has previously been introduced . )

Once more

Cornelius ' s data for his migrant sample (Table 20) suggest a low level
Table 20
Indicator

1 16

Support for Protest Demonstrations

1
�1igrants by Length of
Urban Residence
(in years)
0-2

Regards protest
demonstrations
as the most
5%
effective method
of influencing
a government
decision.
Regards protest
demonstrations
as the least
effective met59%
hod of inf luencing a government decision.

All
Migrants

UrbanBorn

2-4

5-9

10-19

17%

14%

11%

4%

9%

10%

2 3%

26%

38%

4%

37%

51%

2o+

of potential support for such movem��ts among the migrants .

Only nine

percent of all the migrants regard protest demonstrations as the most
effective way to influence government decisions ; some 37 percent believe
116

cornelius , op . cit . , 85 3 .
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this form to be the least effective method .

Certainly this supports

the previous assertion made that migrants are unlikely participants
in urban civic protest movements such as the ACUSP .

Also , as on

other indicators previously mentioned , the data from Table 20 suggest
a higher level of potential support for radical activity among the
marginals than among the migrants .
It is important to note that all

Mexico ' s second generation.

of the data which has been presented was gathered from the responses
of the adult Mexican migrants .

In a country where over 60 percent of

the population is under 25 years of age, it seems the children of the
migrants deserve some attention too. 117

Unfortunately there is no data,

to this writer ' s knowledge at least, on politicization an<l legitimacy
orientation levels which measure the responses of the second generation.
(Obviously , this would be an excellent focus for future original
research . )

However , there are indications (none well documen.ted enough

to report) of protest activity among Mexican secondary level students
enrolled in vocational schools
sons of migrants) .

118

(certainly a likely place to f ind

The high potential for radical political activity

that this second generation possesses should not be overlooked in
future studies related to this topic.
Conclusions.

As previously stated, the case of Mexico presents

additional substantiation for this writer ' s hypothesis I and II .
117 "Mexico 1968 : A Study of Domination and Repression," (New
York: The North American Congress on Latin America, 1968) , 24 .
118

Ibid . , 5 .

Econo-
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mic frustration and socio-psychological adjustment problems among
migrants are far less common than some "urban-instability" theorists
would have us believe .

In addition, the evidence presented in this

chapter supports hypotheses I I I , IV, and V .

Political alienation and

political radicalism, particularly as measured by party preference
and participation, are not characteristic of the rural-urban migrants
in Mexico.

Finally, this data suggests that the marginals are more

likely to engage in radical political activity than the migrants .
One writer points out that the key to Mexic o ' s future stability
lies in the solution of the social and economic problems of her
growing urban areas, where the potential for alienation, political
instability, and outright insurgency is most acute. 119
Mexico provides a good case study for this paper.

In this sense

Table 3 indicates,

of the three main countries (Mexico , Chile , and Venezuela) focused
upon in this paper , Mexico (-.36) ranks lowest on system stability .
However , in providing an open environment which permits expressions
of political radicalism, Mexico , dominated by a one-party structure,
is a less appropriate study than either Chile or Venezuela , which are
the subj ects of the next chapter .

Chile has been chosen because it

has a multi-party system which permits Communist participation.

Al-

though the Communist party in Venezuela is not presently allowed
electoral participation, there is data from the 1958 elections (when
the party was legal) which merits study.

In addition, Venezuela has

119K . F . Johnson, "Mexico , " in Ben G . Burnett and K. F . Johnson
(eds . ) , Political Forces in Latin America : Dimensions of the uest
for Stability, Belmont, Calif . : Wadsworth Publishing Company , 1970) ,
58.

73
been chosen because it has one of the highest urbanization rates in
120
Latin Amer ica .
.

120

Between 19 40 and 1950 the approximate percentage of the
urban growth due to migration in Venezuela was 7 1 percent . See
Hauser , op . cit . , 110.

Chapter IV.
The Migrants in Venezuelan and Chilean Politicti
By expanding the scope of this study to include the Venezuelan
and Chilean political systems , it is proposed that a broader, and
far more representative, analysis of Latin American migrant political
behavior will be possible.

At the same time, the· method of approach

used will also be broadened .

In addition to the discussion of mi-

grant politics from the perspective of the large urban center , the
following material will also focus on one of the most important Latin
American urban sub-systems--the shantytown.
Peripheral shantytowns have become as much a hallmark of most
Latin American capitals and large industrial cities as central plazas .
Estimates of the number of families who live in these shantytowns
vary , but the figure was approximately 4 . 5 million in 1962 .

Population

growth and rural-to-urban migration have greatly swelled the number
sinc e .

One analyst estimates that shantytowns are now growing at the

staggering rate of 15 percent per year .

121

For the study of rural-to-

urban migration, the shantytowns , which ring most of the capitals and
other South American cities, provide an excellent unit of analysis.
121William
L . Flinn, The Process of Migration to a Shantytown
in Bogot � , Colombia, Research Publication No . 49 (University of
Wisconsin Land Tenure Center , Autumn 1968) , 77 .
74
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Most shantytown residents are migrants and marginals .
In the following discussion, the approach used to study the
Venezuelan shantytowns (or barrios as they are called in this case)
will be primarily descriptive ; while that used to study Chilean
shantytowns (callampas) will be both descriptive and empirical.

An

analysis of election data from the larger urban perspective will
conclude the case studies of Venezuela and Chile .
Migrant Politics :
The Barrios of Venezuela.

The Local Perspective
The people of Venezuela are passing

through a critical phase of their history.

At the same time that

they are undergoing the strenuous task of developing into � modern,
industrial nation, they are also trying to forge an effective and
stable democracy out of political traditions that for centuries have
been authoritarian.

122

One of the elements in today ' s society that

will play an important role in determining the success or f aiiure of
Venezuela ' s attempt at political reform �s the people of the barrios-the dwellers of the vast shantytowns that blanket the fringes of every
maj or city.
The history of the formation of the barrios falls into three fairly
well defined stages which correspond to the various waves of migration of Gl'.mpesinos (poor peasants) into the urban areas.

Their

migration has tended to respond sensitively to both rapid economic

122For a general discussion of the course of Venezuel a ' s social
and political development see Frank Bonilla and Jos e A . Silva Michelena
(eds . ) , The Politics of Change in Venezuela: Vol. I, A Strategy for
Research on Social Policy. (Cambridge , Mass . : The M . I . T . Press, 1967) .
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development and transferals o f political powe r .
The first major wave of migration was triggered by a political
event , the coup of October 1945 that brought down the regime of
/

General Isaias Medina Angarita and established in its stead the first
administration in Venezuela ' s history that actively sought the support
of the populace .

For the landless campesino , who until then had been

ignored by the successive governments , this marked the dawn of a new
era.

Many took advantage of the aura of freedom that suddenly pre-

vailed to gather their belongings and travel into the cities (usually
either Caracas or the oil towns in the Oriente) where they expected
the new government would be anxious to respond to their desire for
jobs , free land , and education.

Unable to afford the luxury of

moving into established residential areas, the new arrivals organized
themselves in groups and settled clandestinely on vacant land that
was either publicly or privately owned .

The "ranchos" (as the shacks

are called in Venezuela) that the migrants built represented their
claims to the seized property.

This process of illegal settlement is

commonly called an "invasion" and it is the method by which almost all
barrios have been formed . 12

3

The second wave of migration ran approximately from 1950 through
1957 .

Although this period roughly corresponds to the years that
"

,

President Marcos Perez Jimenez exercised complete control over national
politic s , the stimulating effects of rapid economic development were
more than enough to offset the restrictions imposed by the dictator,
123Talton F . Ray , o p . cit . , 4-5.
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and the rate of urbanization further accelerated .

The third and

latest wave of migration began in January 1958 with the overthrow
/

,

of the Perez �imenez regime .

When the leaders of the Revolution

turned the government over to a popularly oriented military-civilian
junta , the movement of cqmpesinos toward the cities, which thus far
had been substantial by any standards , suddenly grew to tremendous
proportions .

So concentrated was the trend that today more barrios

trace their origin back to those first twenty-four months following
the Revolution than to any other period .
When measured against the experience of other Latin American
countries, migration to Venezuela ' s barrios has been extraordinary .
These barrios today house between one-third and three-quarters of th�
populations of their respective cities.

Official estimates indicate

the following percentages for some of the major cities:

Caraca s , 35

percent ; Maracaibo , 50 percent ; Maracay , 7 0 percent ; Puerto La Cruz ,

�

44 percent ; Cuman , 63 percent . 124
Economic life in the barrio .

For one accustomed to the planned

expansion of urban centers by the gradual extension of paved streets,
water mains , sewer systems , and the construction of buildings and
houses , it is difficult to imagine a community of 3-5,000 persons
annexing itself to a city almost overnight without any of the . city ' s
surveyors , architects, contractors , bankers , and carpenters participating in its development .

Such is the case with most barrios , which

124 charles Abrams , Man ' s Struggl e for Shelter in an Urbanizing
World , (Cambridge, Mass . : The M . I . T . Press, 1964 ) , 13 .
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are brought into existenc e , autonomously a s it were , with little or
no help from the outside business world .

Like a new barrio , the

newly arrived migrant is also at first detached from the urban economy .
Private industries have few recruiting programs that go into the barrio
looking for prospective employees .

125

Thu s , as a result , barrio resi-

dents who are interested in working for large organizations must
search out this kind of employment on their own.

This employment pro-

cedure is not always successful and may be said to generally contribute
to the precarious economic position of most barrio families in Vene
zuela .

126

In addition only a few of the unsuccessful private industry

j ob-seekers demonstrate the ability , or , in some cases even the desire
to find alternative sources of income .

Apparently then, in Venezuela

the conditions which of ten breed economic frustration among the migrants
are widely existent; and in this respect it may be said that Venezuela
is quite unique in the Latin American context .

127

However, i� should

be pointed out that the rural-urban migrants are not the only group
in Venezuelan society which experiences deep economic frustration.
Inequality of income distribution, which is generally characteristic
of the Venezuelan economy , causes a similar reaction among many of the
urban born and the immobile rural residents .

128

125Ray , op . cit . , 14 .
126For example , see Lisa Redfield Peattie, The View from the Barrio,
(Ann Arbor : The University of Michigan Press, 1968) , 35 .
127
see Chapter II of this paper.
128 See G. A . D . Soares, Economic Development and Political Radicalism (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Washington University, S t .
Louis , 1964 ) , 218 .
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Since it appears that the "migrant economic frustration"
theorists may at least have a case in Venezuel a , an investigation
to determine if this frustration finds expression in political
alienation is necessary .
Political alienation in the barrio : the party perspective.

For

grievances generally related to economic frustration the most realistic
means availab.l e to the barrio resident for exerting pressure is through
the opposition political parties.

129

Those are the only organized

groups available to the barrio man which represent a serious threat or
challenge to the government because they are the only ones that compete with it for what it really needs in order to exist--votes .

For

our purposes then a description of the primary pa�ties which have held
office and those which have opposed the government should be helpful ,
particularly by relating their importance to the barrio leve l .
Thirteen political organizations participated in the Venezuelan
national elections on December 1 , 196 3 .
94 percent
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1 30

Of the total valid votes ,

was captured by five of the seven parties described below.

Three of the top five (AD, COPEI, and URD) had been active since 19451946, and the other two (FND and FDP) were founded in 196 3 to nominate
and then support presidential candidates for the election itself .
Another pair of parties (PCV and MIR) , although excluded by law from
129Ray, op . cit . , 9 7 .
13 0
The Venezuelan Elections of December 1 , 196 3 , Part III , (Wash
ington D .C . : Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems,
1964 ) , 2 .
131

Ray, op . cit . , 98 .
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participating in the elections, has nevertheless in recent years
played a significant role in national and local politics--and thu s ,
like the major legal parties , in the dynamics o f barrio affair s .
/

I

ACCION DEMOCRATICA

(AD) .

/

Founded in 1941 by Ro�ulo Betancour t ,

AD was the dominant force in the government between 1945 and 1948.
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I

Under its aegis , Romulo Gallegos was elected president in 1947--the
first man in the nation ' s history to assume that office as the result
of a national election.
a military coup .

His administration was ended in late 1948 by
,,

For ten years under the dictatorship of Perez

,,,

Jimenez which followed , the AD party was outlawed , and many of its
leaders exiled .

AD

played an active role in the Revolution of

January 1958, and at the end of that year its candidate, Betancourt
himself , won the· presidential elections with 49 . 2 percent of the vote.
AD and its junior partner governed together from 1960 to 1964 .
Although ideologically AD can be classified as left of center ,
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it has been compelled--mainly by its own commitment to the industrialization of the nation and by the constant and violent pressure from the
extreme lef t--to adopt goverrunent policies that are more in the center
of Venezuel a ' s political spectrum.

1 2

�

It is true that at least once

�

For an in-depth study of AD , see John D . Martz , Acci n
Democratica: Evolution of a Modern Political Part in Venezuela
Princeton, N .J . : Princeton University Press , 1966) , Also see
Harry Kantor, "The Development of Accion Democr � tica de Venezuel a , "
Journal o f Inter-American Studies (April, 1959) , 237-255 ; and John ·
D . Mart z , ''Venezuel a ' s Generation of ' 2 8 : the Genesis of Political
Democracy , " Journal of Inter-American Studies, (January, 1964 ) ,
17-32 .
133Ray, op. cit . , 9 9 .

81
historically (1948-1957) AD has served a s a vehicle for the expression
of political alienation; however, during the period this writer is
primarily interested in (the 1960 ' s ) , this party has served as the focus
for system support .

.
Furthermore , there are other parties (the PCV and

MIR) in Venezuelan politics which generally serve as far better indices
for political alienation and radicalization.
..

..

Accion Democratica ' s role in barrio politics since. 1959 has been
a response to the critical fact · that at that time the party received
most of its electoral support from the compesinos and that its influence among the urban lower class was generally very weak.

The barrios

were more densely populated and better able to be mobilized for mass
action than any other sector of society; and if the AD administration
had failed to cope adequately with them, the extreme leftist parties
would probably have succeeded in dominating barrio politics, and thus
have been able to cause enough political instability to justify seizure
o f . the government .
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AD approached the problem from three different

angles .
First, it sought to strengthen its position by increasing the
number of its barrio members.

Following the 1958 elections , AD leaders

launched a nationwide campaign of reorganization and recruitment in the
barrio s .

Around the core o f faithful members then available , they

systematically built up a vast network of formal membership groups .
,,

Known as "comites de barrios , " these groups have become the base units

134

Ray, o p . cit . , 111.
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of the party organization in the urban areas, and their headquarters
are now found in virtually every barrio in the country.
The second approach AD used to attack the problem of its weakness in the barrios was to seek control over organized community
leadership by dominating the j untas and molding them into instruments
of its governing policies.

Previously leadership in the great

maj ority of barrios was in the hands of the Communists .
.

/

135

�

For example , in 1958 Accion Democratica received less than 15
percent of the votes in the Federal District (which includes most of
metropolitan Caracas) and ran fourth , behind URD, PCV, and COPEI.
.
In 1959 Caracas ' Municipal Council , junta federation and the individual
j untas were all dominated by representatives or friends of URD and
PCV .

However , in the spring of 1962 , working through the governors

office, AD set about forming a new federation of j unatas in the barrios .
This federation was known as the Movimiento Pro-Desarrollo de la
Comunidad.

The Movimiento was so successful that when the 1962 elec-

tions were held to select j unt� members in several key Caracas barrio s ,
the resulting juntas were organized around three members o f COPEI (AD ' s
coalition partner at the time) , three members of AD, and one independent .
I

I

Accion Democratica also used a third approach in its attempt to
improve its position in the barrios.

Toward the end of the third year

of the Betancourt administration (early in 1962) , it began openly to
sponsor urban conununity development .
135Ray , op. cit . , 114 .
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If one were to assess the overall effect of the AD strategy to
guide the political role of the barrio dwellers and to build up
the party ' s strength in that sector, probably the most useful yardstick would be the national elections of 1963 .

That the elections

were held on schedule in December 1963 and that Betancourt was able
to remain in off ice until completion of his term the following February
are in themselves maj or accomplishments to AD ' s credit.

It is obvious

that the party ' s measures had greatly undermined the influence of the
extreme left in the barrios and that fact in turn was largely the
reason the barrios did not play a more aggressive role during the five
years between 1958 and 1963 .

There was, furthermore , the very encour-

aging fact that attendence at the elections was high:

92 percent .

This

high percentage represented a firm repudiation by the electorate of
the extreme left ' s methods of expressing political dissatisfaction,
since the two illegalized parties -- the Communist PCV and the MIR
had called for a general boycott of

the elections to demonstrate

popular rejection of the Betancourt regime.
PARTIDO SOCIAL CRISTIANO (COPE!) .

Founded in 194 6 , its leader

has always been Rafael Caliera, who was its presidential candidate in
1958 when the party won 15 percent of the vote. 136

COPEI has a repu-

tation of being the "best educated" party, and it points to the large
number of lawyers among its members to support this:lmage.

It was

originally a very conservative organization, but over the years it·
1 36venezuela Election Factbook, December, 196 3 , (Washington D . C . :
Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems) , 17 .
·
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moved to the left and now advocates a progressive program consistent
with Christian Democratic reformism.
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COPEI, however , is still

too far right to be considered politically radica l .
Traditionally, the bulk o f COPEI ' s support had come from the
Andean states, but since 1958 the party has been able to build up
strength nationally, particularly among middle-class women.

Though

it has a highly dedicated core of workers in the barrios , its appeal
in that sector has not yet pro· �<l to be great.

Taking advantage of

serious splits in both AD and the URD , Copei was able to win the
presidential election of 1968 and Rafael Caldera took office as
President of Venezuela in a peaceful transfer of power from AD in
March of 196 9 .

Election data from this election were not available

for analysis in this study.
/

/

UNION REPUBLICANA DEMOCRATICA (URD) .

I

Founded in 1945 by Govito

Villalba , URD was in 1952 the largest and most powerful opposition
party in Venezuela .
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I

,

During the Perez �imenez dictatorship when

AD was outlawed , URD won the national elections of 1952, although
I

'

the results were immediately nullified by Perez J;imene z .
'

With

I

Wolfgang Larrazabal , the president of the Provisional Government, as
its candidate in the 1958 election, URD got 26 . 8 percent of the congressional vote, mainly because of big majorities in the principal
cities (60 percent , for instanc e , in the Federal District) .

137

The

see Venezuela Election Factbook, December 1 , 1968 , (ICOPS) , 1 8 .

1 38 . B . Lott , "The 1952 Venezuelan Elections : A Lesson for 1957 , "
L
Western Political Quarterly , (September, 1957) , 544 .
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political ideology of URD has drifted about and it is thus difficult
to label the party in any consistent way.

From 1960 to 1962 , URD

actively opposed AD and COPEI , and , in fact, aligned itself on many
issues with the Communist party and MIR.

However, in 1963 it j o ined

a new coalition with AD and FND, and today its political ideology is
not significantly different from AD ' s .

In this respect , URD support

is not the best indice for political radicalism in the case of Venezuela.
The 1958 elections showed that URD was much the strongest party
I

in the barrio s , but since its dissociation from Larrazabal, who became
the nucleus of a new party, FOP in 1963 , barrio support for URD has
diminished substantially.
J

FRENTE NACIONAL DEMOCRATICA (FND) .

Organized in 1963 as Indepen-

dientes Pro-Frente Nacional (IPFN) to support the candidacy of Arturo
Uslar Pietri, it changed its name shortly after the elections .

Pietri

appealed to the electorate principally on the basis of his reputation
as a candidate with no commitments to any of the traditional parties.
On most issues he was slightly to the right of center ,

139

and thus

could not be considered a radical force in Venezuelan politics .
In the 1963 elections Uslai won 16 percent of the presidential
vote, while his party got 13 percent of the congressional vote.

The

most consistent support came from the urban middle classes , though in
the large cities of the ceutral states many barrio votes were attracted

139Ray, o p . cit . , 101 �
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as well .
,

FUERZA DEMOCRATICA POPUL.An. (FDP ) .

The party was founded in

I

196 3 by J'orge Dage r , an ex-AD and ex-MIR member, to prepare for the
,

coming elections in support of the candidacy of Wolfgang Larrazabal ,
who had been the president of the Provisional Government and the URD
nominee in 1958.

FDP propose� a more radical program than any of the
I

other legal parties, and Larrazabal was the only candidate to make a
maj or issue of imperialism.
to the barrios .

His campaign was directed almost entirely

Approximately four-fifths of FDP ' s 9 . 9 percent of the

total vote came from metropolitan Caracas , · Maracay, Valencia, and
Maracaibo.
PARTIDO COMUNISTA VENEZOLANA (PCV) and MOVIMIENTO DE IZQUIERDA
REVOLUCIONARIA (MIR) .

The Communist party, the PCV, first organized

in 19 31 , began to play an especially significant part in Venezuela ' s
political life during the Perez .I:imenez dictatorship , when a semiunderground group of its members,. the so-called Black Communis t s , was
able to extend its influence into the labor unions and the field of
secondary and higher education. 140

The party was active in the 1958
,

Revolution, and later that year supported the candidacy of Larrazal:a.! l .
PCV got 6 . 2 percent of the party vote.

It was not invited to partici-

pate in the post-1958 coalition and in 1960 it was j o ined in extreme
opposition by the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria , the Marxist
youth movement which, under the leadership of Domingo Alberto Rangel,

140Robert J . Alexander , Communism in Latin America , op . cit . ,
267-268 .
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had just broken off from AD .

Together , members of the two parties

PCV and MIR, launched an anti-government campaign of rural and urban
guerilla warfare which was conducted under the name of the Fuerzas
/

Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN) .

14 1

The government suspended

their right to operate openly as political parties in 1962 , and
finally made them illegal the following year.
Both tactics and propaganda of the far left parties made it
clear that they considered the people of the barrios one of the keys
to their success.

The barrios , along with the university students ,

had been the sector of society which participated most actively and
enthusiastically in the Revolution of 1958.

Moreover , it was the

barrio dwellers who were suffering most from the economic depression
into which the country had fallen after 1958.

Consequently, leaders

of the urban guerilla campai0n had high expectations of the barrio
people ' s participation.
However , the strategy of PCV and MIR did not produce the results
for which it had been designed.

In fact , as their extremist campaign

got under way, their influence and prestige among the barrio people
began to decline noticeably , reaching a low point at the end of 1963 ,
as was so clearly reflected by the public response to the December
elections .

Three factors appear to have had a direct bearing on the

extreme leftist parties ' loss of support .
First , the calculation of the barrios "ripeness" for revolt was
141

For a description of terrorist activities of FALN see B .
Tape r , "Letter from Caracas: tactics of FALN , " New Yorker , (March 6 ,
1965) , 101-143.
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grossly inaccurate.

It reflected a serious misreading of the people ' s

attitudes a.•d grievances .

One assumption on which the campaign was

apparently based was that many , or most , barrio dwellers were . no
longer willing to tolerate the physical and economic . conditions under
which they lived and hence were prep�red to fight for rapid chang e .
However, such a view represented the essentially middle-class perspec
tive of the leaders of the revolutionary parties who projected their
own impression of wretchedness and misery into the minds of the barrio
people.

It did not recognize that the criteria by which barrio people

j udged their own welfare and advancement were very different from those
associated with the modern urban way of life.
In addition, the FALN ' s urban guerrilla warfare proved to be a
grave tactical error.

Its success in creating a climate of uneasiness

and , to a lesser extent , generating a feeling of hostility toward the
government ' s methods of repression was more than offset by the mood of
revulsion that developed in the barrio s .

Terrorist activities struck

much too close to home for barrio families to look on dispassionately
at the fate of the victims .
Finally the combined government and AD offensive played a decisive
role in weakening the influence of the extreme left in the barrios .
The Communists and miristas were fired by the Ministry of Education,
squeezed out of the government posts, and generally removed from posi
tions of power .
Using extreme political party (PCV and MIR) preference and support
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as

indices of radicalism then, it appears that in the 1960 ' s Vene-

zuelan barrio residents have not been generally disposed to engage in
disruptive political activity.

This is primarily because AD ' s barrio

strategy has been better calculated than that of PCV and MIR, and as
a result far more successful .
The case oi Venezuela suggests something quite significant about
migrant radicalism which may have some applicability for other Latin
American countries.

When migrants do serve as a radical political

force, it is usually because they have been organized through · outside
pressure (such as middle-class PCV leaders) rather than because of
any real assertiveness on the part of the barrio resid�nts themselves .
The most obvious explanation for this lack o� assertiveness is
the barrio people ' s diffidence toward direct and unsanctioned political
action, a characteristic which seems to be largely the consequence of
their lack of confidence in themselves as political actors and insecur
ity in the ominous presence of "authority . 11
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Robert Scott ' s analysis of the psychological barriers to political
participation among Mexicans applies very well to Venezuelan barrio
resident s .

He writes :

"The lack of a feeling of personal effectiveness affects
political competenc e . Although the sense of inadequacy
is masked behind a facade of high cognitive self-appraisal ,
the performance of most persons in the political process
is consistent with their deeper self-image . The sense of
and desire for dependency encourage relation to the output
function; the sense of inadequacy reduces evaluation of
self as a political actor and limits participation on the
142Ray , o p . cit . , 152 .
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input side . 11

143

The lack of confidence that is characteristic of most barrio
dwellers, particularly vis-a-vis their political roles, is further
manifested in their diffidence toward "authority", a nebulous concept
whose presence is always felt in the barrio s .

Authority is usually

identified with government officials and is sensed as much by the
leaders as by_ the people in general.

However, where j untas are

strong and government-supported, they can also represent authority
to the rest of the community.

Well aware that authority is capable

of causing them damage, people are very reluctant to take any public
action that might offend i t .
I t seems clear that the barrio dwellers ' influence on Venezuelan
politics thus far has resulted not nearly so much from their own
actions as from their potential for action.

Except during January

1958 the barrio people have not actively asserted themselves on their
own behalf , nor have they forced changes in current developments .

At

the same time , despite constant prompting by leaders of the extreme
lef t , their political behavior has been notably nonviolent and
generally non-radical .
In the following discussion it is the writer ' s purpose to determine by means of a more empirical approach if similar conclusions
may be reached for the shantytown dwellers in Chile.
1 43

Robert E S co t t , "Mexico : The Established Revolution , " in
Lucian W . Pye and Sidney Verb a , (eds . ) , Political Culture and Political
Development , (Princeton, N .J . : Princeton University Press, 1965) , 356357.
•
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The Callampas of Chile.

The local analysis in Chile will focus

on two lower-class settlements on the urban periphery of Santiago .
Both of these settlements have been recently established , are permanent ,
and have obtained or are in the process of obtaining legal title to
the land.
Population growth and , more importantly , urbanization (that is
rural-urban migrati<>n) have been primarily responsible for the creation
of these settlements .

Their prevailing image among middle and upper-

class people is that of a slum.

It is an image of apathy , misery,

filth, crime , delinquency , prostitution, and family disintegration.
It is also commonplace to view these areas as breeding-grounds for
political instability and extremism.

In the face of their reputation

for social disorganization, these settlers reveal remarkably little
of i t ; crime , promiscuity, broken homes occur infrequently, particularly in comparison with the traditional city slums .

In addition

these communities display a prevailing orientation toward law and
order. 144
The first settlement to be discussed, 3 de Mayo , is a callampa
established apparently with little public notice about 1960 in the
Santiago periphery , the location and layout of which have been deemed
appropriate by the Housing Corporation for "radication. "

This means

144oaniel Goldrich, et . al . , "The Political Integration of
Lower-Class Urban Settlements in Chile and Peru , " (St . Louis : Social
Science Institute, 1967 ) , 5 . For an opposing view, see the work of
University of Chile geographer , Pedro Cunill , Geograf {a de Chile,
94 .
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that the settlement has won a presumption of legal permanence from
the government .
Santo Domingo is one of the new Chilean government housing
projects located along the periphery of the capital ' s workingclass distric t s .
Domingo .

There are two maj or recruitment patterns in Santo

About 40 percent of the residents were successful appli

cants , having approached the government or been approached as resi
dents of callampas by government social workers and become enrolled.
About 30 percent were either direct invaders of the project site
or invaders of other government projects who won recognition of
their desperate housing situation and were transferred into Santo
Domingo .

The remaining residents included relatives of the other

wise qualif ied.
Politicization in the callampas .

As the following data collected

in 1965 indicates (See Table 21) , the sample of Chilean shantytown
residents show a significantly higher level of politicization then the
sample of Mexican residents f�om Cornelius ' s study. 145

Perhaps this

may be explained by the fact that Cornelius did not pick his sample
solely on the basis of shantytown residenc e .

One might expect a

higher level of politicization among the permanent squatter settle
ments and housing projects (from which the Chilean sample was taken)
because the residents have had to anticipate dealing with the govern
ment before entry; and the invasion preparations involve sophisticated
planning with regard to mobilizing political support and immobilizing
145 see Chapter III of this paper.
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Table 21 146
Politicization Indicators
S_
i n�
to _
o �
a_
o
y�
n_
3 de M_
Do_
g�
m_
a_
+-�
�_
_
+-- _ _

�
---�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�

__ __

I

"How interested are you in
what the government is doing"
Very

39%

32%

Substantially

31

24

A little

25

38

5

5

Makes some mention of what is
"most important national pro
blem"

88%

.88%

Voted in both last presiden
tial and congressional or
municipal elections

81%

66%

Indicates elections and cam
paigns have some personal
significance

58%

58%

Not at all

agencies of governmental repression.

147

Granting an apparently high level of politicization in 3 de Mayo
and Santo Domingo , this does not mean the residents of these callampas
must be radically inclined to pursue politically disruptive behavior .
146Goldri·ch ,

et . a1 , o p . ci' t , 13

l47 rbid . , io-11.

•

•

•
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A high level of politicization is generally thought to be a necessary ,
but certainly not a sufficient , condition for political radicalism.
In addition, the callampa residents must display low legitimacy
orientations toward the Chilean political system.

In fact a high

politicization level accompanied by high legitimacy orientations would
imply high system affection rather than system opposition.

148

As the

data in Table 22 indicates , legitimacy orientations among the residents of Santo Domingo and 3 de Mayo are certainly not low enough to
sugge s t the proper conditions for political radicalism.

In fact all

of the items , with the possible exception of 2 . , imply relatively
high legitimacy orientations in these two callampas .
One note of caution must be inj ected, however.

What the callampa

residents have achieved individually and collectively within the past
few years may be dissipated tomorrow.

Much depends on whether they

find some support in the society, and on their integration into the
national society.

If they do not find support , if neither their

achievements nor they themselves win recognition and respect somewhere in the larger society, then the following consequences seem
likely in the near future.

Children, raised with much parental

ambition and sacrifice, may fail to find the means to get ahead or
become embarrassed about living in such settlements .

In either event ,

high intrafamilial tensions and a high level of frustration and selfhate among the youth may resul t .

148

Thu s , the next gen�ration could ·

Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment , o p . c i t . , p . 14 .
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Table 2 2
Patterns of Legitimacy

Item

Santo Domingo

3 de Mayo

1 . "In general our systems of
government and politics is
good for the country" :
Agree strongly
Agree slightly
Disagree slightly/strongly

65%
21%
11%

53%
28%
15%

35%
43%
18%

32%
44%
24%

75%
12%
12%

69%
14%
15%

80%
15%
5%

76%
16%
6%

2 . Affiliation to a party:
None/independent
Government*
Opposition+

I

3 . "Violence should never be the
way to resolve political
problems " :
Agree strongly
Agree slightly
Disagree slightly/strongly
4 . "Social change is acceptable
only if it doesn ' t provoke
disorder" :
Agree strongly
Agree slightly
Disagree slightly/strongly
*
+

The government party is Christian Democracy in Chile
The opposition coalition is the Socialist and Communist
(FRAP)

149

Goldrich, e t . al . , o p . cit . , 17 .
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greatly raise the costs to the nation of malintegration of the
settleme� t s , either by venting their frustrations in political
opposition or extreme privatization.
In concluding the discussion focused on the local level , it
might be well to add that consequences similar to those described
in the preceding paragraph may characterize the Venezuelan situation
in the future should the PCV and MIR adopt more suitable tactics
to woe the barrio dwellers.

This writer finds little, if any ,

evidence that shantytown dwellers in Venezuela and Chile have been
politically radical during the 1960 ' s .

The 197 0 ' s and 1980 ' s ,

however , may be different .
In order to test the conclusions reached through analysis of
the local unit , this writer proposes to analyze national election
data from Venezuela and Chile.

Before doing s o , however, it might

be helpful to have some understanding of the political party process in Chile.

(The important parties in Venezuelan politics have

already been discussed . )
Political Parties in Chile
When discussing the strong French influence on Chilean political
and cultural life, the late Arturo Alessandri and other prominent
public leaders have invariably cited the large number of political
parties.

This small nation of nine million people, in fac t , outstrips

·
its Gallic model in this respec t ; the recent Chilean political spectrum
has included as many as eleven parties having parliamentary representation. 150
l50Roger S . Abbot t , "The Role of Contemporary Political Parties in
Chile , " The American Political Science Review , (June , 1951) , 451.
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A brief discussion of the maj or parties follows .
PARTIDO CONSERVADOR UNIDO (PCV) .

The United Conservative Party,

the oldest and first ruling party in Chile,

151

has traditionally been

the party of the landed aristocracy and the wealthy .

The forward to

the 1961 PCV platform declared th�t the party ' s "fundamental doctrine
is in keeping with the teachings of the Church . "

The platform called

for the removal of government from business and advocated a corporate
state.

152

Today the PCV continues to represent the economic elite

and draws most of its strength from rural areas in the center of the
country.
PARTIDO LIBERAL (PL) .

The Liberal Party had its origins in

opposition to the authoritarian and ecclesiastical bias of the Conservative Party.

It came to power in 1861 and ruled securely until 1 8 9 1 .

Shortly thereafter, the religious issue disappeared and no significant
difference remained between the Conservatives and Liberals .

Today

they are united with the Radical Party (�artido Radical) in a centerright bloc.

Traditionally, the Liberals have been the party of the

wealthy industrialist and upper-middle classes, but in recent years
they have been able to develop and maintain an electoral base in rural
53

areas as well as urban areas. 1
PARTIDO RADICAL (PR) .

The Radical Party was formed in 1861 .

151

Federico G . Gil , The Political System of Chile, (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company , 1966) , 245.
152
1 53

chile Election Factbook, September 4 , 1964, (ICOPS) , 23.
Ibid . , 24 .
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During its early years it displayed an orthodox 19th century liberalism, but evolved slowly toward a collectivist orientation to meet
the growth of popular movements during the first decades of the
twentieth century.

The Radical Party cooperated with the Alessandri

government in the early 60 ' s , although it presented a candidate of
No other party in the Chilean poli-

its own in the 1958 elections .

tical system has had as varied a composition as the Radical Party.
The PR includes northerners from the mining districts, southern landowners , small merchants , professionals , intellectuals , artisans , and
many skilled workers .

In the main, however , the characterization of

the Radical Party as representative of middle-class urbanites holding
white-collar j obs is accurat e .

154

PARTIDO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO . (PDC) .

The Radical Party forms the

right wing of the Chilean Center ; the Christian Democratic Party , the
lef t .

PDC evolved from a young branch of the Conservative Party

influenced by Christian social ideas from Europ e .

The PDC platform

is strongly reformist in tone , stressing the needs of the poor and
calling for corrective government action.

The new party grew slowly

during the Forties and early fifties; but in the 1963 municipal
elections it led all other parties for the first time.

The hard core

of the PDC consists of Catholic members of the middle class.

In

addition efforts have been made to attract Protestant s , agnostics ,
atheis t s , and Jews , in order to transmute the party into a genuine
non-confessional movement .

155

Led by Edwardo Frei Montalva , the

154 Gil , op . cit . , 260-261.
155 For a general discussion of Christian Democracy see James Petras ,
Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1969), 197-255 .
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Christian Democrats won the 1964 presidential election campaigning
for a "Revolution in Freedom . "
FRENTE DE ACCION POPULAR (FRAP) .

The four parties of the left-

communist , Socialis t , National Democratic , and National Vanguard o f
the People are allied in the Popular Action Front (FRAP ) .

This

coalition was established in February, 1956 , when the two major factions of Socialist s , the Labor Party (�artido del Trabaj o) , and a
splinter of the Democratic Party j oined forces.

Partido Socialists (PS) ,

which is composed of Marxists , humanistic socialists , and anarchssyndicalist s , has been marked by divisions within its ranks .

At times

it has cooperated with the Communist Party and at other times has
bitterly opposed i t .

The party ' s current program reflects its pre-

sent alliance with the Communist Party in FRAP .

PS strength is rather

evenly divided geographically, although in scattered provinces it
receives no votes.

The Partido Communista de Chile (�CCR) is the

strongest and best organized Communist party in Latin America. 156
Chile in contrast to other Latin American countries has given the
Communist Party a great deal of freedom of operation.

PCCH has been

legal for most of its history and even when outlawed (1948-58) was
not systematically persecuted .

The principal theme of the PCCH pro-

gram is anti-imperialism, which it equates with anti-Americanism.
The party calls for the expropriation of all foreign-owned enterprises .
The principal Communist s trongholds are the mining regions in the ·
Great North and Little North and the coal mining areas of Arauco in
156
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the Frontier region.

The FRAP leader is Socialist Senator Salvador

Allende Gossens.
Analysis of Recent Elections in Venezuela and Chile
The primary purpose of the following election analysis by state
(Venezuela) and province (Chile) is to test the validity of the
writer ' s conclusions from the analysis of the local uni t .
dology used will be quite simple.

The metho

Radical voting patterns in areas

with heavy in-migration will be compared with the patterns in out
migration regions .

If extreme leftist voting is much heavier in

the receiving areas than in the areas of origin, then we may have
some basis for believing that the migration experience is an important
determinant in producing radical political attitudes and behavior.
I t should be pointed out , however , that there is , at least, one big
drawback to this type of analysi s .

Voting data from the receiving

areas studied is , of course, a collection of both urban-born and
migrant responses.

The urban-born sample is probably quite small ,

but may still be significant enough t o affect the validity o f any
conclusions drawn from this analysis .

Despite the problems , this

breakdown may prove valuable as a guide to future researchers who
might be interested in isolating the migrant population.

It will be

noted that the analysis will concentrate on the early and mid-196 0 ' s .
This i s due to the fact that more recent election statistics are not
available .
Recent Venezuelan Elections.

Caracas (which is in the Federal

District) is generally recognized as having one of the highest urbani-

101
zation rates in Latin America.

A large proportion of the migrants
�

to Caracas came from the state Bolivar , which is located in the
Llanas Guayana interior.

This interior region is essentially rural,

still provincial and isolated in many parts , and has the lowest
population density of all Venezuelan regions .

157

It was mentioned earlier that the rural-urban migrants appear
to have been most politically radical during 1958.

Electoral data

for the Federal District and Bolivar (See Table 23) support this
Table 23 158
Communist Party Presidential Vote
I

(for Larrazabal) . December 1958

State
Federal
District
Bolivar

contention.

PCV (Larrazabal)
Vote

Percentage

2 9 , 997

7 . 4%

1 , 584

2 . 2%

;

In fact the percent for Larrazabal in the Federal Dis-

trict (7 .4%) was the highest in all of the states and territories,
/

while the percent for him in Bolivar was well below the average .
It will be remembered that the PVC and the MIR called for a

157

John D . Mar t z , "The Venezuelan Elections of December 1 , 1963 ,
(!COPS) , 4 .
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venezuelan Elections of December 1 , 1963 , Part I I I , 1 3 .
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boycott of the 1961 elections .
voter participation

r o ·· -

However in the Federal District

from 422 ,738 in 1958 to 478 ,466 in 1963.

159

Also the winning AD cantli�ates in both the 1958 and 1963 elections
(Betancourt in 1958 and Leoni in 1963) each polled about 14% of the
vote in the Federal Distric t .

160

This evidence further substantiates

the contention that the PCV-MIR boycott was not successful and that
Venezuelan migrant radicalism was far less potent during the 196 0 ' s
than during the 1950 ' s .
Recent Chilean Elections .

According to Bruce Herrick, Santiago

has the highest rate of urbanization in Chile .

161

In addition about

88% of the candidates for migration to Santiago came from the central
third of the country.

162

Thus we may conclude that area of origin
,

/

for Santiago migrants includes the provinces of Valparaiso , Concepcion,
�

and Coutin.

163

As the following data indicates (See Table 24) the

vote for Salvador Allende (The FRAP candidate) in 1964 was actually
higher in two of the three areas of origin than it was in Santiago .
In addition, a study of the 1952 Chilean national elections
provides further evidence that the rural-to-urban migrants did not
prefer Allend e .

164
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venezuelan Elections of December 1 , 1963 , Part I I I , 1 2 , 2 1 .
160
161

Ibid . , 21 .

Herrick, op . cit . , 30-31.
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Ibid . , 4 7 .

see map in The Chilean Presidential Election of September 4 ,
1964 , Part I I , (!COPS , 1965) , 18 .
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Table 24

165

Vote for Allende by Province in 1964

Province

% for Al lende

Santiago

35 . 7 0

Valparaiso

36 . 09

,

Concepcion
/

Coutin

49.32
3 1 . 16

This data, then, appears to affirm the evidence of high system
affect among migrants from our analysis of the local unit in Chile .
However, the reported substantial level of support for D r . Allende
in the impending 1970 elections ; the resurgence of former President
Allessandri ; the significant reforms as well as the failures of the
Christian Democrats under President Frei since 1964

all await

analysis following the outcome of what appears to be a very close
Autumn 1970 election campaign.
In conclusion it should be made clear however, that the next
generation of Venezuelan and Chilean urban poor may break pattern of
the 1950 ' s and 60 ' s and , in fac t , provide an important base fpr
political radicalism in Latin America.

165 G . Soares and R. L . Hamblin, op . cit . , 1062.

Chapter V .
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper the writer has been concerned with economi c ,
socio-psychological, and political factors which are important in
determining the Latin American rural-to-urban migrant ' s propensity
to engage in radical political activity.

In Chapter II our dis

cussion, which covered the general Latin American setting, focused
primarily on economic and socio-psychological factors although some
data on political activity was also included.

The last two chap

ters, which included case studies of Mexico , Venezuela, and Chile ,
were primarily concerned with the political process , particularly
the political party process , and the migrant ' s relation to i t .
Generally this material was structured in such a way t o demon
strate the invalidity of the Latin American "migrant radicalization"
theories .

Using the English language research material and data

which is now available , it is the writer ' s contention that this
objective has been achieved insofar as the period of the 19SO ' s and
1960 ' s is concerned .
All of the data which bear on the "economic frustration" theory
indicate that the amount of economic frustration which actually ·
exists is far less than enough to substantiate this theory .

This 'is

particularly demonstrated by the data on migrant unemploymen t .
1 04
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It was also found that migrants have very few socio-psychological
adjustment problems .

The fact is that (1) most migrants have had

some exposure to the urban environment previous to moving to the city,
(2) most migrants do not suffer from social isolation, and (3) most
migrants preserve strong family and kinship ties in the urban complex.
Indices of politicization and legitimacy orientations (See the
case studies of Mexico and Chile . ) generally point to the fact that
there is very little evidence of migrant alienation from the political
system for the time being .
And finally , a study of radical voting patterns and support for
protest demonstrations (See the material on Mexico . ) yields no basis
for the contention that the political alienation which does exist is
converted into radical political action.

This writer found only one

imp<.,rtant exception and this was the case of the Venezuelan migrants
leftist support in 1958.
In addition, two other propositions have been formulated by
this writer as a result of his research.

(1) When the migrants do

engage in radical a�tivity , they are usually "the led", instead of
"the leaders" .

(The best recent example is that of the middle-class

PCV leaders who mobilized the migrants in 1958 .
may point

Historically, we

I

:;o

Peron in Argentina and Odria in Peru, who were both

successful in gaining migrant support . )

For this reason, it follows

that when the leaders are not to be found , the migrants are likely
t·o remain radically inactive.
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(2) The bulk of the evidence . indicates that the group we have
defined as the "marginals" are much more likely to be radical acti
vists than the migrants themselves .

Marginals , when compared with

the migrant s , combine a higher politicization level with a lower
system affection level .

This means the marginal is much more unhappy

with the existing system and also more likely to know what to do about
expressing his displeasure.

Also, although virtually no data presently

exists to test this , there is strong reason to believe that the second
generation in the urban slums possess an even greater radical poten
tial which may well be activated in the future .

First, this second

generation will not be able to compare his present status with the
poor conditions in the rural areas as their parents were able to do .
Thus it is logical to expect that they will feel more relatively de
prived than their parent s .

Add t o this the fact that this new

generation is likely to receive a far superior education to that of
their parents , and thus will probably be far more highly politicized.
The result is a potentially very explosive situation for the future.
On the basis of the preceding observations, this writer contends
that a much more reasonable theory than that proposed by migrant
radicalization theorists may be suggested.

This theory is based

historically on stages.
Theory by stage s .

I n the earliest stage from 1930 t o 1950

(possibly from 1930 to 1960 for the case of Venezuela) the rural-to
urban migrant may have contributed to the radicalization of Latin
American politic s , reflected in various successful and abortive

107
revolutions and changes of regime .
,

166

For example , this period saw

,

the rise of Accion Democratica in Venezuela , of Getulio Vargas in
�

Brazil and Peron in Argentir. a .

Although, t o this writer ' s knowledg e ,

data substantiating this point has not yet been gathered , the evidence available implies that these movements had a large migrant
base.

167
The second stage (the· one this paper has focused on) from 1950

to 1970 (1960 to 1970 for Venezuela) has been one characterized by
little radical activity among the migrant s .

Although one can only

speculat e , it appears that this period has not seen the dynamic
leaders needed to mobilize the migrants and that the migrants are
not yet ready to lead themselve s .
However , it i s possible, in fact quite likely, that there will
be a third stage in this proces s .

In this stage the second genera-

tion (the migrant ' s children) may well begin to produce their own
leaders who will mobilize the masses for radical political activity.
Obviously this theory is far too incomplete to serve as an
explanatory device (and in this sense might more appropriately be
called a series of propositions) ; however, the primary purpose for
outl: .. ing it is to offer suggestions for future research.
Further suggestions for future research .

This writer, as he

researched this topic on the political effects of rural-to-urban
migration, was constantly aware of the need for more survey data on
166
167
York:

ttobsbawn in Veliz, op. cit . , 6 5 .

See, for example , Robert J . Alexander , The Peron Era, (New
Russell and Russell, Inc . , 1965) , 7-8.
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the political attitudes and behavior of Latin American migrants .
In this respec t , several suggestions may be made for the benefit of
future analysts who are able to do original surveys in this area.
Firs t , it seems much more must be done in determining legitimacy
orientations (the level of system affect) of the migrants , particu
larly at the local level (as in the two settlements in Chile) .
Certainly to arrive at the base of the study of system instability
one must analyze the populous ' s attitude toward the system, for
obviously that attitude will shape the individual ' s political be
havior .

Also, better indices (than voting behavior) must be created

to gather evidence of political radicalism.

A step in the right

direction might be to gather more data bearing on an existent �ndex
preference for and support for protest demonstrations.
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that data gathered in
the future may very well invalidate the conclusio�s reached here;
however , at present it appears that during the period roughly from
1950 to 1970, Latin American migrants have not been an important
force for political radicalism.
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